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Abstract
Consumers’ willingness to pay for an identical product, e.g. as caused by differ-
ences in local income or tastes, may differ greatly across locations. Yet, while a large
literature examines consumers’ optimal price and product-search behavior under vari-
ous market configurations, the equilibrium effects of such consumer segregation remain
unexplored. To this end, I study a stylized model in which two local monopolistic mar-
kets differ in size and their consumers’ willingness to pay. After observing their native
market’s price, a subset of flexible consumers may travel to the other market at posi-
tive cost, hoping for a bargain. I show that as long as the proportion of flexible high-
valuation consumers is not too large, active and directed search to the lower-valuation
market will occur in equilibrium. If the higher-valuation market is relatively large in
size, complex mixed-strategy pricing emerges in equilibrium. For regulators, increasing
the fraction of flexible consumers tends to be more effective than manipulating search
costs.
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1 Introduction
Consumers’ characteristics often vary considerably across geographically close locations.
For example, many empirical studies document that income tends to be highly segregated in
urban areas—the rich rarely locate door-to-door with the poor.1 Similarly, the local average
income and purchasing power differ greatly between many neighboring countries, such that
cross-border shopping is a widely observed phenomenon.2 Alternatively, even with identi-
cal income, consumers’ tastes may be heterogeneous due to differences in their composition
(young families vs. pensioners, students vs. employees, etc.). But also the usage or con-
sumption of a physically identical good may be more costly or generate less gross utility
for consumers in one location than another, independently of where they purchased it (for
example, because country/state A has different taxation levels than country/state B—cars
come to mind—or because the required infrastructure is less developed in one location than
another).
All of the above examples have two things in common. The first is that consumers in one
local market may have a higher (average) willingness to pay for a given good than consumers
in a nearby, distinct local market. The second is that due to geographical proximity, at least
some consumers may find it optimal to travel from their native market to another if they
perceive its price level to be lower.
Although there is a large theoretical literature dealing with (often heterogeneous) con-
sumers’ optimal search behavior for low prices (or good product matches) and firms’ equi-
librium response,3 the specific form of consumer heterogeneity analyzed in this paper re-
mains unexplored: local clustering and segregation of consumers resulting in heterogeneous
demand characteristics across submarkets. The question is then how the presence of such
consumer heterogeneity affects firms’ equilibrium pricing and consumers’ purchasing be-
1See e.g. Bischoff and Reardon (2013) and Florida and Mellander (2015) for recent reports on income
segregation in major U.S. metropolitan areas.
2See e.g. “Swiss Shoppers Storm German Border Towns,” Spiegel Online, 2011. A relatively recent
survey of the vast economic literature on cross-border shopping is given by Leal et al. (2010).
3Seminal papers in the consumer search literature include Diamond (1971) and Stahl (1989) (sequential
search for homogeneous products), Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999) (sequential search
for differentiated products), and Burdett and Judd (1983) (fixed-sample-size search for homogeneous prod-
ucts). Baye et al. (2006) provide a detailed survey of theoretical and empirical studies on price dispersion in
homogeneous-goods markets. A detailed literature review, with particular emphasis on research dealing with
consumer search under asymmetric market configurations, can be found below.
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havior, given that consumers do not observe prices outside their local market. If consumers
have to incur a strictly positive cost of accessing an outside market, under which circum-
stances would they still be willing to search4? How does this affect firms’ pricing strategy,
and is there scope for beneficial policy intervention?
In order to answer these questions, I study the following stylized setting. There are
two spatially separated markets, each home to an identical local monopolist producing a
homogeneous good. The markets differ in size and their local consumers’ willingness to
pay for the good. Hence, in the absence of a link between the two markets, each firm would
charge the local monopoly price. However, there is a link between the markets, such that a
subset of “flexible” consumers may travel to the other market at strictly positive cost. The
flexible consumers can be thought of as sophisticated consumers who are aware of the (from
their perspective) outside market’s existence and its characteristics. At the same time, they
do not face prohibitively high costs of accessing the outside market, for example because
they own a car, do not have high opportunity costs of time, or enjoy shopping. In contrast, all
consumers who are not flexible are captive to their local firm. Then, given that the flexible
consumers’ search costs are not prohibitively high, the following main results are obtained.
The first is that if a large fraction of consumers in the high-valuation market is flexible,
paradoxically no search occurs in the unique equilibrium of the game. This is because the
firm in the high-valuation market (henceforth called “H”) finds its local flexible consumers
too important to lose, and optimally charges a sufficiently low price that discourages them
from leaving towards its rival in the low-valuation market (henceforth called “L”). Although
the markets are segregated, there is a strong link between them due to a large fraction of
flexible consumers. Consequently, H’s pricing is fully disciplined by L’s existence, and
search does not take place.
The second major result is that if the fraction of flexible consumers in the high-valuation
market is sufficiently small and at the same time the high-valuation market is not too large
relative to the low-valuation one, in the unique equilibrium of the game, each firm sets its
4Throughout the paper, I will often speak of “search costs” when referring to consumers’ costs of reaching
an outside market and obtaining a price quote from there. Of course, a large part of these costs may be
comprised of physical transport costs and/or opportunity costs of time. Still, the important property justifying
the terminology is that prices outside the local market are not observable before incurring the transport cost.
In Section 5, I consider a model variant in which prices are perfectly observable ex ante, such that the costs of
accessing an outside market can be thought of as pure transport costs. See further below in the introduction
for a more detailed motivation.
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price equal to its local consumers’ valuation, and the high-valuation market’s flexible con-
sumers travel to the low-valuation market and purchase there with certainty. L has no incen-
tive to increase its price, as this would drive out its local consumers with a lower willingness
to pay. At the same time, H has no incentive to discourage its local flexible consumers from
searching, as it would have to decrease its price by too much. This situation is reminiscent of
cross-border shopping and other forms of directed travel in which consumers exploit local
price differences. Instead of choosing prices that are low enough to retain all local con-
sumers, firms in a higher-income country may accept that some consumers will purchase
abroad, and tailor their prices towards local consumers who are less mobile—be it due to
opportunity costs, travel costs, lack of information, or other reasons.
The third main result is that, if the high-valuation market is relatively large (and the
proportion of flexible consumers is not too high), a pure-strategy equilibrium fails to exist,
and complex mixed-strategy equilibria with active search emerge. The intuition is as fol-
lows. If H chose the local monopoly price and the flexible high-valuation consumers were
to search, expecting a low price, L would find it optimal to maximally exploit these con-
sumers by (almost) charging the price of its rival, despite driving out its (relatively small
mass of) local consumers. However, this would undermine the high-valuation consumers’
incentive to search in the first place, and even if they searched, this would give firm H a
reason to undercut. This tension can only be resolved by mixed-strategy pricing in which
L probabilistically exploits incoming searchers by pricing above its local consumers’ valu-
ation, but then sometimes does not sell at all because it is priced out by its rival. The latter
occurs because with positive probability, H engages in a sale that may beat L’s high-range
prices. Remarkably, if market H is very large compared to L, a novel and second type of
mixed-strategy equilibrium emerges in which H sometimes engages in a deep sale, which
altogether discourages its local flexible consumers from searching. This is necessary to
sufficiently reduce L’s incentive to price above its local consumers’ valuation.
Considering the above findings, my model contributes to the theory of search (for ho-
mogeneous products) by unifying several plausible properties of search markets that are
relatively uncommon in the literature. The first is that, although all consumers face a strictly
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positive search cost, the famous Diamond (1971) paradox5 does not (always) arise: H may
choose prices well below its local monopoly price in equilibrium. This does not only oc-
cur when H finds it optimal to prevent its flexible consumer group from searching due to
competitive pressure by L, but also as an equilibrium response to firm L’s attempt to exploit
incoming searchers. While the former rationale is well-understood in different setups (see
e.g. Reinganum (1979)—compare with the literature discussion below), the latter is, to the
best of my knowledge, novel. The second property is that active search may emerge, as H
may price above its flexible consumers’ reservation price in equilibrium. I argue that this
stems from an interaction of search-cost heterogeneity and spatial heterogeneity in tastes,
and point out that the combination of these two is necessary to generate search in the model.
In contrast, standard sequential search models such as Stahl (1989) and Janssen et al. (2005)
induce an endogenous reservation price above which no firm prices in equilibrium, prevent-
ing active search.6 Third, and again to the best of my knowledge, the model is the first
which can simultaneously generate spatial and temporal price dispersion in equilibrium.
The price dispersion is spatial, in the sense of Salop and Stiglitz (1977) and Reinganum
(1979), because L charges prices that are on average lower than H’s. On the other hand,
if no pure-strategy equilibrium exists, the price dispersion is also temporal, in the sense
of e.g. Shilony (1977), Varian (1980) and Rosenthal (1980), because in equilibrium, both
firms sample prices randomly from overlapping supports. Hence, complex sales patterns
arise in which H sometimes engages in promotions which may beat L’s price, or which may
altogether discourage its local flexible consumers from shopping around.
After discussing the different types of equilibria that arise in the baseline model, I turn
to a welfare analysis. I identify two potential sources of welfare loss in the market: wasteful
travel expenditures undertaken by searching high-valuation consumers, and deadweight loss
created by dropout low-valuation consumers. While the former occurs whenever the frac-
tion of flexible high-valuation consumers is not too large (otherwise, H fights for its flexible
consumers and the social first-best is achieved), the latter only occurs if a pure-strategy equi-
5Roughly speaking, the Diamond paradox says that if all consumers face positive search costs and search
sequentially, every firm in a symmetric oligopoly must charge the monopoly price in equilibrium.
6Two exceptions are given by Stahl (1996) and Chen and Zhang (2011). In both of these papers, search-
cost heterogeneities across consumers with positive search costs may lead some consumers to search actively
in equilibrium. However, the respective models require that consumers’ search cost distribution extends down
to zero (with a positive mass at zero in the case of Chen and Zhang) in order to generate price dispersion.
4
librium fails to exist. In that case, firm L prices above its local consumers’ valuation with
positive probability in equilibrium. This finding also endogenizes an empirical regularity
that has been widely documented, namely that poorer consumer groups tend to find it more
difficult to access certain product markets (see e.g. Somekh (2012, 2015) and the references
therein). In my model, I show that, if the high-valuation (high-income) market is relatively
large in size, the firm in the low-valuation (low-income) market may consider it optimal to
(probabilistically) exclude its local consumers from purchasing. This is because higher rents
can be extracted from less price sensitive (or more wealthy) shoppers coming from outside.
Regulators aiming to improve market efficiency or consumer surplus may try to manip-
ulate consumers’ search costs or alter the fraction of potentially searching consumers. I
establish that increases or decreases in these variables have no clear-cut effects, such that
even a reduction of search costs or an increase in competition through the fraction of flexible
consumers may backfire. However, one main result is that boosting the fraction of potential
searchers may be less risky, as once a certain threshold is reached, both total social welfare
and consumer surplus will be maximized. This is caused by the competitive pressure that
H faces for its (then large) segment of flexible consumers, which forces it to price aggres-
sively and discourage search. Importantly, this result continues to hold when considering
extensions to downward-sloping individual demand.
Finally, in some markets the assumption that firm L’s price is not observed by H-market
consumers is clearly violated. Moreover, it is a priori unclear how much of the models’
results are driven by unobservable prices outside consumers’ local markets (and their en-
suing search problem), rather than pure transport costs in a perfect-information setting.7
After the main analysis, I thus consider a variation of the baseline model in which the flex-
ible consumers costlessly observe all prices, while they still need to incur strictly positive
travel costs in order to purchase outside of their home market. This has several advan-
tages. First, it allows for a characterization of the resulting pricing equilibria and market
outcomes when all prices are observable, which is arguably more realistic for certain market
environments. Second, it provides a robustness check of the baseline model’s findings with
respect to the described change in information structure. And third, it helps to disentan-
7Note also that comparative statics with respect to search costs may alternatively be interpreted as com-
parative statics with respect to transport costs, while prices outside the local market remain unobservable.
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gle the different effects of search and transport costs on market outcomes. I find that the
model’s complexity increases significantly if there is a large fraction of flexible consumers:
the baseline model’s pure-strategy equilibrium without search breaks down, and three new
types of mixed-strategy equilibria emerge. At the same time, L-market consumers unam-
biguously benefit relative to the baseline model when there are many flexible consumers,
while total social welfare is reduced. Hence, regulations that improve consumers’ access to
price information may increase consumer surplus at the cost of aggregate welfare.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The paragraph below discusses the
related literature in more detail. In Section 2, the model setup is introduced. The different
equilibria of the baseline game are analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 is concerned with
welfare and regulation. An extension to perfect information is provided in Section 5. Section
6 concludes and points out some potential directions for future research. Technical proofs
related to the existence of all characterized equilibria are relegated to Appendix A. Appendix
B establishes uniqueness of the baseline model’s equilibria.
Related Literature This article ties into the literature on price dispersion and consumer
search under asymmetric market configurations. An important early contribution was given
by Narasimhan (1988), who extends Varian’s (1980) classic model of sales (where firms
have symmetric loyal consumer bases, and compete in prices for a perfectly price-sensitive
mass of “shoppers”) to the case of asymmetric shares of loyal consumers across (duopolistic)
firms. However, in contrast to the present work, consumers’ willingness to pay is symmetric,
and (sequential) search is ruled out, as consumers are either perfectly informed about all
prices, or are fully captive to their preferred firm.
Kocas and Kiyak (2006) extend Narasimhan (1988)’s model to oligopoly and allow for
differences in willingness to pay across firms. Similar to Narasimhan, sequential search
is ruled out. Moreover, their model differs from the present contribution because there is
no local clustering of consumers with different valuations: each available product is val-
ued the same by all consumers, although product quality may vary across firms. Instead, I
study a situation in which products are homogeneous, while consumers are segregated and
differentiated with respect to their willingness to pay.
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Reinganum (1979) allows for sequential search, but generates price dispersion through
marginal-cost heterogeneity across a continuum of firms, combined with elastic consumer
demand. In her model, high-cost firms charge consumers’ reservation price, whereas low-
cost firms set their monopoly price. Contrary to the present contribution, consumers are
homogeneous, and no active search arises in equilibrium.
Extending Reinganum’s (1979) model, Benabou (1993) admits heterogeneity in con-
sumers’ search costs on top of firms’ heterogeneity in marginal costs. In his model, low-cost
firms charge their monopoly price, while all others are disciplined by consumers’ (active)
search. There may also be a bunching of prices for certain segments of marginal costs.
Clearly, search is driven by different forces than in the present article, as consumers differ in
their search costs, but not in their valuations. Moreover, there is a continuum of firms, and
mixed-strategy pricing does not occur.
Rajiv et al. (2002) provide a complex marketing model in which differentiated con-
sumers, both with respect to firm loyalty and their valuation for product quality, may search
across vertically differentiated retailers. In their model, search only occurs if at least one
firm advertises its price, and consumers are not segregated. Moreover, the authors’ focus
lies on firms’ equilibrium frequency of advertising prices and their depth of promotional
discounts.
Close in spirit is a recent paper by Astorne-Figari and Yankelevich (2014), who consider
a setup in which duopolistic competitors differ in their number of local (captive) consumers.8
As in my model, these consumers do not directly observe the outside firm’s price, but may
obtain this information at positive cost. In the unique equilibrium, both firms play mixed
strategies, but the price distribution of the firm with the larger mass of local consumers first-
order stochastically dominates that of its rival. The major difference to the present work is
that price dispersion is driven by an atom of shoppers, rather than by a local heterogeneity in
consumers’ willingness to pay. Proper search does not occur in equilibrium, and eliminating
the atom of shoppers leads to the Diamond result. Moreover, the firm with lower average
prices cannot have an incentive to exploit incoming searchers, as non-local consumers with
positive search cost never visit it.
8See also Astorne-Figari and Yankelevich (2011) for a more detailed, earlier working paper version.
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Other related papers that explicitly account for market asymmetries in a search frame-
work are given by Burdett and Smith (2010) and Kuniavsky (2014). In Burdett and Smith
(2010), one dominant firm with a continuum of retail outlets competes with a fringe mass of
atomistic sellers, and consumers employ a noisy search technology in the spirit of Burdett
and Judd (1983). Kuniavsky (2014) extends the standard sequential search model of Stahl
(1989) to allow for heterogeneously sized sellers (where sellers with more outlets have a
higher probability of being sampled first). In both of these papers, price dispersion is driven
by supply-side heterogeneities, rather than market segregation and the resulting differences
in local demand characteristics.
Since all consumers in my model face positive search costs, yet prices are dispersed in
equilibrium, the paper also relates to a small literature on resolving the Diamond paradox
under strictly positive search costs. Examples include Bagwell and Ramey (1992), who
resolve the paradox by consumers making repeat purchases, and Rhodes (2015), who avoids
the problem by considering multi-product retailers.
Finally, since the flexible consumers in my model may find it optimal to exploit local
price differences, this article is also related to a literature on (third-degree) price discrimina-
tion with costly arbitrary, see e.g. Aguirre and Paz Espinosa (2004), Marchand et al. (2000),
Anderson and Ginsburgh (1999), and Wright (1993).
2 Model Setup
Consider the following market. There are two spatially separated local submarkets H (“high
valuation”) and L (“low valuation”) that host one risk-neutral firm each, labeled and indexed
by their locations. The firms compete in prices pH , pL and sell a single homogeneous
product that is offered in their respective market only. The firms’ identical, constant unit
costs are normalized to zero.
A total mass α ∈ (0,1) of consumers live in H, whereas the remaining mass 1−α live
in L. The consumers’ valuations for the homogeneous product are identical within the local
markets. That is, all consumers that live in H have unit demand up to a maximum valuation
of vH , whereas all consumers that live in L have unit demand up to a lower maximum
valuation of vL < vH .
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In the baseline model, each consumer only observes the price posted by the firm in
her home market. However, some consumers are flexible in the sense that they can travel
to the other market at positive cost, purchasing there if the observed price is lower. For
expositional simplicity, I assume that the L-market consumers are fully captive in the sense
that they will never visit H. Given pL, they either buy directly (if pL ≤ vL), or not at all.9
In contrast, some consumers in H have the possibility to search. Being heterogeneous with
respect to their search behavior, a fraction 1−β of H-consumers is captive as well. Given
pH , they either buy directly (if pH ≤ vH), or not at all. On the other hand, a fraction β
of H-consumers are (potential) searchers: at a travel cost s ∈ (0,vH − vL),10 they can visit
market L and return, purchasing there if the observed price is lower. In all of what follows, I
will refer to these potentially searching consumers as flexible H-consumers. Note that in the
model, searching consumers have to return to their home market after observing the other
firm’s price. This setup is both natural and consistent with the usual assumption of free
recall in search models.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, firms H and L simultaneously choose their
prices pH and pL, which are then fixed for the rest of the game. Second, each consumer
observes her home market’s price, and all captive consumers buy immediately as long as the
observed price does not exceed their valuation. Third, the mass αβ of flexible H-consumers
observe pH , form (potentially probabilistic) beliefs about firm L’s price pL, and optimally
decide whether to search L, purchase directly at H, or drop out of the market.11 If they do
not visit market L, they purchase at H, provided that pH ≤ vH . If they visit market L, they
9This assumption does not affect any of the results and is only made to streamline the model setup. In
Appendix B, I show that, as long as the L-market consumers’ search costs are bounded away from zero, they
will never search in equilibrium, irrespective of their search-cost distribution.
10For s ≥ vH − vL, the unique equilibrium of the game is given by the uninteresting case in which H
prices at vH , L prices at vL, and no consumers search. On the other hand, while the subsequent equilibrium
characterization also fully applies to the case where s = 0, some of the resulting equilibria require the flexible
H-consumers to play the weakly dominated strategy of not always searching initially. And precisely in these
cases, there is equilibrium multiplicity, because another equilibrium exists in which the flexible H-consumers
do always search initially. In fact, the model extension to perfect information in Section 5 fully characterizes
these additional equilibria when setting s = 0. And conversely, when there is no equilibrium multiplicity, the
equilibria of the baseline model coincide with those of the perfect-information framework. Further details are
available from the author upon request.
11They might also randomize among some subset of these options in case of indifference, but it turns out
that this not relevant in equilibrium. See also footnote 13 below.
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incur the travel cost s, observe L’s price pL, and optimally buy at the cheaper firm (given
that its price does not exceed their valuation).12,13
The solution concept I employ is a “strong” variant of perfect Bayesian equilibrium in
the spirit of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, Section 6). As is usual, the flexible H-consumers’
beliefs need to be consistent with firm L’s pricing in equilibrium. Furthermore, the solution
concept imposes some restraints on firms’ signaling abilities. In particular, it entails a “no-
signaling-what-you-do-not-know” property: Even if firm H chooses a price p′H that is never
played in equilibrium, the flexible H-consumers’ beliefs about firm L’s price are not affected,
since firm H has no more information about firm L’s price than these consumers and hence
cannot signal anything about it. For the present model, this has the same consequences, but
is weaker than assuming passive beliefs.14
Figure 1 provides a graphical summary of the considered market structure. In the next
section, I proceed to solve for the equilibrium of the described game given the parameters
vH , vL, α, β, and s.15
3 Equilibrium Analysis
The game’s different types of equilibria are characterized by the following sequence of
propositions.16
12Note that it is assumed throughout that consumers purchase with certainty whenever they are indifferent
between purchasing or dropping out of the market. Indeed, this is pinned down in any equilibrium where such
indifference may arise with positive probability.
13Some further words on tie-breaking. Note that apart from the situation where pH = vH , the flexible H-
consumers may be indifferent between some of their available actions under two different circumstances: (i)
they may observe a price pH that makes them indifferent between purchasing directly at H or searching market
L, given their beliefs about firm L’s price, and (ii) after having searched market L, it may turn out that pL = pH ,
such that they are indifferent between from where to buy. For (i), it is clear that in any equilibrium where this
is relevant (i.e., indifference occurs with positive probability), all flexible H-consumers must buy directly at H.
If they did not (such that they purchased at L with strictly positive probability), firm H would have a profitable
deviation by reducing its price marginally and breaking the indifference. (This argument also relies on the
fact that firm H makes a positive profit in equilibrium, which is evident due to its mass α(1−β) of locked-in
consumers.) For (ii), it turns out that the tie-breaking rule is not determined in equilibrium, as such ties arise
with zero probability in any equilibrium of the game.
14I thank Régis Renault and an anonymous referee for stressing this fact.
15Clearly, either vH , vL or s can be normalized to some arbitrary constant, e.g., vH = 1 (such that vL and s
can be expressed as fractions of vH ). For expositional reasons, I will not do so throughout the paper.
16All existence proofs can be found in Appendix A, while uniqueness of the baseline model’s equilibria is
established in Appendix B.
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L H
mass α consumers
mass 1− α consumers
valuation vL each
valuation vH > vL each
travel cost s ∈ (0, vH − vL)
price pL price pH
L’s price unobserved for αβ
αβ
flexible H-consumers
α(1− β) captive consumers
Figure 1: Depiction of the analyzed market.
Proposition 1. If β > β := 1− vL+svH ∈ (0,1), the unique equilibrium of the game is in pure
strategies such that p∗H = vL + s ∈ (vL,vH), p∗L = vL, and all αβ flexible H-consumers pur-
chase in H. H’s equilibrium profit is given by Π∗H = (vL + s)α, whereas L’s equilibrium
profit is given by Π∗L = vL(1−α).
The intuition to Proposition 1 is straightforward: if sufficiently many H-consumers are
flexible, H finds it worthwhile to fight for these consumers and discourage them from search-
ing. The optimal way for H to achieve this is by charging the maximal markup over L’s
price which deters the flexible H-consumers from searching: p∗L + s. Note moreover that
p∗L < vL cannot be part of an equilibrium. If it was, H would either find it optimal to charge
p∗L+ s < vH (if p∗L is sufficiently close to vL) or the highest possible price vH (if p∗L is small).
In either case, L could achieve a higher profit by increasing its price a little, as this would
not decrease its demand. Hence, for a large β, the only possible equilibrium is such that
p∗L = vL, p∗H = vL+ s, and no search occurs.
Proposition 2. If β< β and α≤α(β) := vLβ(vH−vL)+vL ∈ (αmin,1), where αmin =
vHvL
v2H−(vL+s)(vH−vL)
∈
(0,1), the unique equilibrium of the game is in pure strategies such that p∗∗H = vH , p∗∗L = vL,
and all αβ flexible H-consumers search and purchase in L.17 H’s equilibrium profit is given
by Π∗∗H = vHα(1−β), whereas L’s equilibrium profit is given by Π∗∗L = vL(1−α+αβ).
17In the non-generic case where β= β, given that α≤ α(β) = αmin, the equilibria of Propositions 1 and 2
coexist (see Figure 2 below for an illustration). This is because for β= β, H is indifferent between discouraging
its local flexible consumers from searching (by pricing at vL+s) or maximally exploiting its captive consumers
while letting go of its flexible consumers (by pricing at vH ). Note that firm L’s expected profit is strictly higher
if the equilibrium of Proposition 2 is played.
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Intuitively, β< β is simply the converse of the condition in Proposition 1: if sufficiently
few H-consumers are flexible, H would not even find it worthwhile to fight for them if L
priced at vL deterministically. Instead, H prefers to fully exploit its captive consumers by
pricing at vH , and accepts that all its local flexible consumers will search and buy at the other
firm.
Note that this logic is the key driving force which leads to active search in equilibria
of the game. In typical search models, active search can be generated by taste and product
heterogeneity or search-cost heterogeneity. In my model, it is the combination of taste and
search-cost heterogeneity that induces active search. To see this, note that each factor alone
would be insufficient to do so: If the consumers in market H were homogeneous in search
costs (with common costs s > 0), firm H would clearly not be willing to let them go in any
equilibrium, so the spatial heterogeneity and clustering of consumers’ valuations would be
unable to induce search. On the other hand, if consumers’ willingness to pay was identical
across submarkets, search-cost heterogeneity would also be insufficient to generate search,
as both firms would simply set their price equal to consumers’ (common) valuation. But
taken together, consumers’ difference in valuations may create a wedge in local monopoly
prices that would lead to a directed outflow of flexible high-valuation consumers, and this
outflow is indeed not prevented by firm H if the fraction of flexible H-consumers is not too
large.
Although β≤ β is necessary to generate the above pure-strategy equilibrium with active
search, it is not sufficient. A further requirement is that the size of market H is not too
large, α≤ α(β), which rules out that L has a profitable deviation. The logic behind this is as
follows. Clearly, given that H prices at vH deterministically and does not fight for its flexible
consumers, an expectation of p∗L = vL by the flexible H-consumers would induce them to
search. But then, if the H-market is sufficiently important in size (α is large), L no longer
finds it optimal to charge vL. Namely, rather than to also serve its own local consumers at
this low price, L would prefer to exploit the flexible consumers’ beliefs (of finding p∗L = vL
in L) and charge them the highest possible price (vH) for which they do not return to H. This
is the case if α> α(β).
The outlined incentive to exploit incoming searchers and the tension to resolve it is
what generates the mixed-strategy equilibria which will be discussed below. Importantly,
12
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Figure 2: Equilibrium regions for vH = 200, vL = 100, s = 10.
these equilibria also entail active search by the flexible H-consumers (at least with positive
probability in the case of Proposition 4). Figure 2 illustrates the different equilibrium regions
in (α,β)-space.
Proposition 3. If β < β and α ∈ (α(β),α(β)], where α(β) := vL
(1−β)
{
vL+
vHβ[vH (1−β)−vL]
vH (1−β)−vL−βs
} ∈
(α(β),1),18 the unique equilibrium of the game is in mixed strategies such that19
• H samples prices continuously from the interval [p,vH), where p = vL(1−α+αβ)αβ ∈
(vL,vH), following the CDF FH(pH) = 1− 1−α+αβαβ
(
vL
pH
)
. Moreover, H prices at vH
with probability q∗H :=
vL(1−α+αβ)
vHαβ ∈ (0,1).
• L prices at vL with probability q∗L := 1β − vHα(1−β)vL(1−α+αβ) ∈ (0,1). Moreover, L sam-
ples prices continuously from the interval [p,vH) following the CDF FL(pL) = 1β −
1−β
β
(
vH
pL
)
.
18While α(β) always falls in this range (with α(0) = 1 and α(β) = α(β) = αmin), it can be non-monotonic
in β for certain combinations of vH , vL and s.
19Note that unlike the case where β= β, there is no multiplicity of equilibria for α= α(β). This is because
the equilibria of Propositions 2 and 3 coincide for α→ α(β), as can easily be shown.
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Figure 3: Expected firm profits and equilibrium CDFs for vH = 200, vL = 100, s = 10,
α = 0.9, β = 0.14. The vertical axis can be interpreted both as monetary units (for ΠL(pL)
and ΠH(pH)) and percentage points (for q∗L, q∗H , FL(.), FH(.)).
• As p > ρ, where the flexible H-consumers’ reservation price ρ solves q∗L(ρ− vL) = s,
all αβ flexible H-consumers search initially. However, they return with probability
1−FL(pH), as in those cases L charges a higher price than H.
• As in the case of Proposition 2, H’s equilibrium profit is given by Π∗∗H , whereas L’s
equilibrium profit is given by Π∗∗L .
Figure 3 provides a graphical example of an equilibrium of the characterized type.
The intuition to Proposition 3 is as follows. Because the H-market is large compared to
L (α>α(β)), firm L would no longer find it optimal to charge vL if the flexible H-consumers
searched (after facing pH = vH and a belief of pL = vL), as it would strictly prefer to exploit
these consumers’ beliefs by charging vH instead. However, this cannot be an equilibrium,
because (a) given pL = vH , the flexible H-consumers would clearly prefer not to search, and
(b) even if these consumers searched, H would have a profitable deviation by marginally
undercutting vH (say, by pricing at vH − ε), which would lead all flexible H-consumers to
return to H after observing pL = vH . Consequently, L would also have a profitable deviation
of pricing marginally below vH− ε, and so on. This cycle of best responses gives rise to the
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mixed-strategy equilibrium characterized in the proposition: both L and H price at their local
consumers’ valuation with positive probability mass, but they also “fight” for the flexible H-
consumers in those cases where L prices above vL.20 In some sense, in order to mitigate L’s
incentive to always exploit the searchers, H alters its strategy in such a way that it becomes
harder for L to sell to the searching H-consumers if it prices above vL. H achieves this by
spreading positive probability mass on some interval below vH , implying that L is indifferent
between choosing vL or any price larger than vL that lies in that interval.
Since firm L charges prices higher than vL with positive probability in equilibrium, this
implies that low-valuation consumers are excluded from buying probabilistically. Hence, the
characterized equilibrium is in line with the empirical finding that low-income consumers
tend to suffer from poor access to certain product markets, as discussed in the introduction.
This continues to hold for the last type of equilibrium to be characterized below.
Proposition 4. If β < β and α ∈ (α(β),1), the unique equilibrium of the game is in mixed
strategies such that21
• H prices at the flexible H-consumers’ reservation price ρ∗ := vH(1−β) with proba-
bility q∗H,ρ := 1− 1−ααβ
(
vL[vH(1−β)−vL−βs]
[vH(1−β)−vL]2+vLβs
)
∈ (0,1). Moreover, H samples prices con-
tinuously from [p,vH), where p =
vH(1−β)[vH(1−β)−vL]
vH(1−β)−vL−βs ∈ (ρ∗,vH), following the CDF
FH(pH) = 1− q∗H,vH
(
vH
pH
)
= 1− 1−ααβ
(
(1−β)vL[vH(1−β)−vL]
[vH(1−β)−vL]2+vLβs
)
vH
pH
. Finally, H prices at
vH with probability q∗H,vH :=
1−α
αβ
(
(1−β)vL[vH(1−β)−vL]
[vH(1−β)−vL]2+vLβs
)
∈ (0,1).
• L prices at vL with probability q∗L,vL := svH(1−β)−vL ∈ (0,1). Moreover, L samples prices
continuously from [p,vH) following the CDF FL(pL) = 1β − 1−ββ
(
vH
pL
)
.
• As H prices at the flexible H-consumers’ reservation price ρ∗ with positive probability
q∗H,ρ, these consumers will only search if H prices at or above p > ρ∗, which happens
20The technical reason why a pure-strategy equilibrium may break down is that there may be discontinuities
in firms’ best response functions. For example, if β< β and α> α(β), firm L’s best response to pH > vL and
(for simplicity) a strategy of always searching by the flexible H-consumers is p∗L = vL for pH ≤ vL(1−α+αβ)αβ
and p∗L = pH−ε for larger pH . Similarly, firm H’s best response to pL ≤ vH and a strategy of always searching
by the flexible H-consumers is p∗H = vH for pL ≤ vH(1− β) and p∗H = pL− ε for higher pL. Due to these
discontinuities, no pure-strategy equilibrium exists in the parameter region in question.
21Note again that unlike the case where β = β, there is no multiplicity of equilibria for α = α(β). This is
because the equilibria of Propositions 3 and 4 coincide for α→ α(β), as can easily be verified. On the other
hand, the equilibria of Propositions 1 and 4 coexist if β = β and α > α(β) = αmin (see Figure 2 above for an
illustration). As in the case where Propositions 1 and 2 coexist (if β = β and α ≤ αmin), L makes a strictly
higher profit if the equilibrium of Proposition 4 is played.
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Figure 4: Expected firm profits and equilibrium CDFs for vH = 200, vL = 100, s = 10,
α = 0.9, β = 0.4. The vertical axis can be interpreted both as monetary units (for ΠL(pL)
and ΠH(pH)) and percentage points (for q∗L,vL , q
∗
H,ρ, q
∗
H,vH , FL(.), FH(.)).
with probability 1− q∗H,ρ. However, given that H prices at pH ∈ [p,vH), they return
with probability 1−FL(pH), as in those cases L charges a higher price than H.
• H’s equilibrium profit is given by Π∗∗H , whereas L’s equilibrium profit is given by
Π∗∗∗L :=
(1−α)(1−β)vHvL[vH(1−β)−vL]
[vH(1−β)−vL]2+vLβs
.
Again, Figure 4 depicts a graphical example of an equilibrium of the characterized type.
The intuition to Proposition 4 is similar to that of Proposition 3. The crucial difference
is that for a very large α, the H-market is so important relative to L that firm L would always
want to price above its local consumers’ valuation if the flexible H-consumers searched with
certainty. Indeed, note that since firm H can guarantee to make a profit of vHα(1−β) by
pricing at vH , in equilibrium firm H may never price below vH(1−β) (> vL), as it would
make a lower profit than vHα(1−β) even if it always sold to the flexible H-consumers. In
turn, if the flexible H-consumers searched with certainty, L could guarantee to attract them
by pricing at vH(1− β)− ε, making a profit arbitrarily close to vH(1− β)αβ. This profit
strictly exceeds firm L’s profit when pricing at vL, that is, vL(1−α+αβ), for α sufficiently
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close to one.22 Hence, for very large α, L can only be made indifferent between charging vL
or exploiting the searching H-consumers if the flexible H-consumers do not always search
initially. H achieves this by putting positive probability mass on the flexible H-consumers’
reservation price ρ∗ = vH(1−β), such that L cannot even be certain to exploit the flexible
H-consumers if it prices at p, the lowest price in its pricing range above vL.
Note that the equilibrium of Proposition 4, particularly the pricing strategy of firm H,
is consistent with empirical evidence that retail price distributions tend to be bimodal, with
prices fluctuating between a “regular” high price and a low “sales” price, and little mass
between (see Hosken and Reiffen (2004), Pesendorfer (2002)). The present model provides
a complementary explanation to that of Garcia et al. (2015), who generate a two-point price
distribution by introducing costly retailer search for manufacturers’ offers.
4 Welfare and Regulation
In this section, I first pin down the expressions for total social welfare and consumer surplus
that arise in the different equilibrium regions of the model. I proceed to argue which pa-
rameters may be potential targets for policy intervention, and discuss how changes in these
parameters affect total and consumer welfare. Finally, I briefly consider what would happen
if demand was price elastic.
Welfare. Since the consumers have inelastic demand up to a maximum valuation of vH
in H (where a total mass α of consumers reside) and up to vL in L (where the remaining
1−α consumers reside), it is obvious that the maximal surplus which can be achieved in the
whole market is given by
W := αvH +(1−α)vL. (1)
Considering the different equilibria which were outlined in Section 3, there are two pos-
sible sources of welfare loss in the market. First, wasteful travel expenditures to the extent of
22Precisely, this is true for α > vL(1−β)(vL+vHβ) ∈ (α(β),1). Although this value is close to α(β) for small β
(e.g., 0.9084 vs. 0.9045 for vH = 200, vL = 100, s = 10, β= 0.14), there is always a non-empty range of α’s
where the mixed-strategy equilibrium of Proposition 3 breaks down due to more subtle reasons. Indeed, the
mixed-strategy equilibrium of Proposition 3 breaks down for α > α(β) because firm H, and not firm L, has a
profitable deviation (i.e., to price at the flexible H-consumers’ reservation price with certainty).
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αβs can be incurred if the αβ flexible H-consumers search. And second, the L-market sur-
plus of (1−α)vL is lost in those cases where L prices above vL, as this leads all L-consumers
to drop out of the market. The following proposition then follows straightforwardly from
Propositions 1 to 4.
Proposition 5. The expected total welfare in the market is given by23
W :=

αvH +(1−α)vL if β> β
αvH−αβs+(1−α)vL if β< β and α≤ α(β)
αvH−αβs+q∗L(1−α)vL if β< β and α ∈ (α(β),α(β)]
αvH− (1−q∗H,ρ)αβs+q∗L,vL(1−α)vL if β< β and α ∈ (α(β),1).
(2)
As consumers’ demand is inelastic, the aggregate expected consumer surplus for each
parameter region can easily be calculated as CS =W −Π[∗]H −Π[∗]L , where Π[∗]i denotes the
equilibrium profit of firm i ∈ {H,L} in the respective parameter region. Clearly, with in-
elastic demand, L-market consumers never make any positive surplus, as firm L never prices
below vL in equilibrium.
Proposition 6. The aggregate expected consumer welfare (derived exclusively by H-market
consumers) is given by24,25
CS :=

α(vH− vL− s) if β> β
αβ(vH− vL− s) if β< β and α≤ α(β)
αβ(vH− vL− s)− (1−q∗L)(1−α)vL if β< β and α ∈ (α(β),α(β)]
αβ(vH− vL− s)− (1−q∗L,vL)(1−α)vL
+ q∗H,ραβ(vL+ s)
if β< β and α ∈ (α(β),1).
(3)
23If β = β, the expected total welfare depends on which equilibrium is played. It is αvH +(1−α)vL if H
plays vL + s, whereas it is αvH −αβs+(1−α)vL if H plays vH (for α ≤ α(β)), or αvH − (1− q∗H,ρ)αβs+
q∗L,vL(1−α)vL if H plays its (mixed) equilibrium strategy of Proposition 4 (for α> α(β) = α(β)).
24Again, if β= β, the equilibrium consumer welfare depends on which equilibrium is played. See footnote
23 above for details.
25In order to obtain the expression for the last case, note that Π∗∗∗L = vL[1−α+αβ(1−q∗H,ρ)].
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Comparative Statics and Regulation. The analyzed model is governed by five param-
eters: Consumers’ maximal willingness to pay in the high and low-valuation market (vH
and vL), the distribution of consumers across markets (α), the search cost of flexible high-
valuation consumers (s), and the share of flexible consumers in the high-valuation market
(β). Note however that the first three of these are rather deep structural parameters that can-
not easily be targeted by policymakers. For example, if the model is used to describe firms’
equilibrium pricing and consumers’ shopping patterns across the neighborhoods of a city,
neither the composition of consumers, nor their different willingness to pay (e.g., as caused
by differences in average income or preferences) can easily be manipulated.
On the other hand, both the search friction of consumers traveling across spatially sep-
arated submarkets (s), as well as the fraction of (flexible) consumers that are aware of this
opportunity and do not find it prohibitively costly to do so (β), may potentially be influenced
by policy.26 For instance, in order to decrease s, the local administration could build new
roads or walkways, improve the public transportation system, or provide amenities such as
parking spaces, public toilets, and temporary childcare facilities. Of course, s may also be
increased through opposing measures.27 Likewise, the fraction of flexible (high-valuation)
consumers β may be increased by an informational campaign that educates consumers about
the possibility and attractiveness of purchasing in an outside market (with on average lower
prices), infrastructural measures such as the connection of formerly remote areas, or invest-
ment in services like a shuttle-bus line for consumers without cars.
While policy-relevant, analyzing the impact of changes in s or β on total social welfare
and consumer surplus turns out to be a complex task. First, since four different equilibrium
regions arise in the model, changes in s and β may lead to transitions across equilibrium
regions, which, in turn, may have conflicting comparative statics. For example, while total
social welfare is maximal and independent of s in region I (where no search takes place), it
26Note that both s and β provide information about the high-valuation consumers’ search cost distribution.
Indeed, the present model has an identical outcome to the model variation where a fraction β of high-valuation
consumers has a search cost of s, while all remaining high-valuation consumers have search costs that exceed
vH − vL. In a more general model allowing for an arbitrary search-cost distribution, policy-induced shifts of
this distribution could be analyzed.
27As one referee put it, a regulator may want to build a really tall wall between markets in order to discour-
age search. While this may indeed maximize market efficiency in the present setup with inelastic demand and
wasteful search frictions, the right balance needs to be struck if consumers’ interests are also to be considered.
See below for a more detailed discussion.
19
strictly decreases in s in regions II and III, while it can be shown that it strictly increases in s
in region IV.28 At the same time, consumer surplus strictly decreases in s for regions I to III,
while it strictly increases in s for region IV.29 Second, even within equilibrium regions, the
comparative statics of social welfare and consumer surplus may not be monotone. Precisely,
an increase in β has an ambiguous effect on social welfare in region III,30 while its effect on
consumer surplus is ambiguous in both regions III and IV.31 An example of the comparative
statics of total social welfare and consumer surplus with respect to s and β is provided in
Figure 5.
Although it is thus apparent that no clear-cut comparative statics with respect to s and
β can be provided, some policy recommendation can still be given. Namely, it turns out
that for all parameter values, there is a critical s′ and β′ such that for all s ≥ s′ (keeping
β fixed), or for all β ≥ β′ (keeping s fixed), total social welfare is maximized. Moreover,
consumer surplus is maximized for a single value of s in this range, namely the lower bound
s= s′, whereas it is maximized for all β≥ β′. These findings are highlighted in the following
proposition.32
28That total social welfare strictly decreases in s in regions II and III follows from the fact that the flexible
H-consumers always search initially in the corresponding equilibria (creating a wasteful search friction of
αβs), while firm L’s probability of sampling vL (such that no deadweight loss is created) is independent of
s. In region IV, an increase in s increases both firm L’s equilibrium frequency of charging vL and firm H’s
equilibrium frequency of charging the flexible H-consumers’ reservation price ρ (such that no wasteful search
friction is incurred). It can be shown that the welfare gains induced by this always dominate the welfare loss
stemming from higher search costs in those cases where firm H prices above ρ. A proof is available from the
author upon request.
29The latter effect is surprising and stems from the fact that both firm L’s equilibrium probability of charging
vL and firm H’s equilibrium probability of charging ρ (the lowest price in its support) strictly increase in s in
the relevant region (see also the previous footnote related to social welfare). This is always sufficient to offset
the higher travel cost incurred by searching high-valuation consumers (in those cases where H prices above
ρ). A proof is once again available from the author upon request.
30The intuition for this is that countervailing effects are at play. Since all flexible H-consumers search
initially in region III, an increase in their absolute number through β leads to an unambiguous increase in
the wasteful search friction αβs that is incurred. On the other hand, there are parameter constellations within
region III under which firm L’s equilibrium probability of sampling vL increases in β, which reduces the
(expected) deadweight loss that stems from dropout low-valuation consumers. For some of these parameter
constellations, the latter positive effect on welfare dominates.
31Again, these surprising results are caused by firms’ equilibrium responses. In region III (IV), consumer
welfare may decline because an increase in β may lead firm L (H) to reduce its equilibrium probability of
charging vL (ρ).
32For the proposition, it is assumed that equilibrium type I (without search) is played whenever β = β
(which is the unique equilibrium for any β> β). The statement for social welfare is obvious (region I without
any welfare losses is reached if and only if s ≥ s′ or β ≥ β′). The statement for consumer surplus follows
because all H-consumers are able to buy at the lowest possible effective price vL + s (firm L may never price
below vL in any equilibrium) if and only if equilibrium type I is played. If s is allowed to vary, this price is
lowest for s = s′.
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Figure 5: Expected total social welfare (blue) and consumer surplus (orange) as functions
of s (left panel) and β (right panel). The parameters used are vH = 200, vL = 100, α= 0.85,
as well as β = 0.4 (left panel) and s = 10 (right panel). The different equilibrium regions
that are reached are separated by dotted lines.
Proposition 7. For any combination of parameters vH , vL, α and β, total social welfare
is maximized if and only if s ≥ s′ := max{vH(1− β)− vL,0}, while consumer surplus is
maximized if and only if s = s′. Likewise, for any combination of parameters vH , vL, α and
s, both total social welfare and consumer surplus are maximized if and only if β≥ β′ := β.
A regulator that aims to maximize total social welfare and consumer surplus (which
seems sensible, given that both objectives can be achieved simultaneously) thus faces two
options. First, it may try to find the “sweet spot” for the search cost s such that it is just
high enough that H finds it optimal to fight for its local flexible consumers by pricing at
vL+ s (and not charging vH or sampling prices from [p,vH ], with p > vL+ s), but not higher
than that. If vH(1−β)− vL ≤ 0, then this is the case even for s = 0, such that a regulator
that is (also) concerned for consumer surplus should aim to reduce consumers’ search costs
as much as possible. If instead vH(1−β)− vL > 0, the optimal s is positive, and hence a
regulator may even have an incentive to artificially increase s (making the outside market
less accessible, levying taxes, etc.) if s is low initially. In reality, a regulator may find it
hard to justify such measures (which, after all, may have severe negative consequences for
society that are not captured in the model), and even in the context of the model, it runs a risk
of harming consumers (compare with Figure 5, left panel). Hence, it seems that influencing
s through policy measures should be undertaken cautiously: If there is no search but only
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competitive pressure (region I), then reducing s may increase consumer welfare, but there is
a risk that firms in a high-valuation market may respond by increasing their prices in order
to exploit locked-in consumers—which, at the same time, induces wasteful search frictions.
On the other hand, if there is search initially, increasing s may restore the first-best, but this
may also harm consumers when done incorrectly, face resistance from the population, and
have adverse consequences that are not part of this analysis.
The second option a regulator may have is to raise the fraction of flexible high-valuation
consumers β. Although marginal increases in β may still have a (moderately) negative effect
on welfare and consumer surplus (compare with Figure 5, right panel), there is no longer a
danger of “overshooting”: Once a certain threshold is surpassed (β ≥ β), full market effi-
ciency is restored, and consumers’ surplus is maximized. The intuition is that a sufficiently
large fraction of non-loyal high-valuation consumers is able to fully discipline the behav-
ior of the local incumbent, even though no search takes place. This is because, by these
consumers’ (correct) expectations of finding pL = vL in market L, firm H cannot afford to
charge a higher price than vL+ s, as this would turn away a sizable chunk of its demand. In
other words, efficiency is restored precisely because H faces a threat of search by a large
fraction of its local consumers, to which it responds by pricing aggressively (and thus, the
threat does not materialize).
Note that there can be circumstances where increasing the fraction β of potentially
searching consumers is not very costly: Indeed, it may suffice to inform (a larger fraction of)
the population that searching is a viable strategy. On the other hand, especially reductions in
s could require infrastructural measures that are prohibitively expensive. Thus, promoting
the possibility of search may often be more beneficial than actually inducing search through
a physical reduction in search costs.
Downward Sloping Demand The showcased model focuses on inelastic consumer de-
mand in order to build intuition and keep the analysis tractable. Of course, this comes at the
cost of realism, such that it would be desirable to allow for (a) downward-sloping individual
demand and/or (b) heterogeneous consumer valuations within submarkets. While providing
a full equilibrium analysis is challenging for both of these variations (and lies somewhat
beyond the scope of the paper), the following result prevails under similar assumptions as
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in the baseline model:33 If the fraction of flexible consumers in the market with a higher
local monopoly price is sufficiently large, there will be no search in equilibrium, as the
local incumbent finds it optimal to discourage these consumers from searching by pricing
aggressively. In contrast, the firm in the neighboring low-valuation market charges the local
monopoly price. In the setup with downward-sloping individual demand, it can be shown
that this equilibrium is constrained-efficient, as no wasteful search frictions are incurred,
and deadweight loss is minimized. Indeed, increasing β should generally be (even) more
desirable under elastic demand, as giving a larger fraction of consumers access to low prices
will tend to reduce deadweight loss.
5 Perfect Information Setting
In contrast to the specification of the main model, consumers may sometimes be well-
informed about the prices charged by firms in a distinct regional market. For example, a
consumer considering cross-border shopping for some expensive good (e.g. a new car) will
likely try to obtain price quotes before traveling to the outside market.34 Moreover, as mo-
tivated in the introduction, it seems worthwhile to check the baseline model’s robustness
with respect to changes in the information structure, and to contrast the different effects of
search costs (in the sense of information-acquisition costs) and pure travel costs on market
outcomes. While an exhaustive comparison between all variables of interest (equilibrium
pricing strategies, firm profits, consumer surplus and total social welfare) across the differ-
ent model setups would be beyond the scope of this paper, some selected key differences
will be highlighted.
To this end, I consider a variation of the main model in which flexible H-market con-
sumers can perfectly observe the price posted by firm L. However, they still have to incur
a travel cost s in order to access market L. Hence, in the corresponding perfect-information
framework, flexible H-consumers find it optimal to purchase from L whenever pL < pH − s
(≤ vH − s). All other market parameters (α, β, vH and vL) keep the same interpretation as
in the main model. Importantly, in order to facilitate a comparison with the baseline setup,
33Details are available from the author upon request.
34Clearly, the rise of price-comparison platforms on the internet, as well as the tendency of many firms to
post prices online, has greatly facilitated such a practice.
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I still assume that all L-market consumers are fully locked in to their local firm, and that
s < vH− vL.
Note that in this adaptation, it still holds that for a small fraction β of flexible H-
consumers, firm H would not even be willing to fight for these consumers if firm L charged
vL deterministically. The corresponding critical value of β is again given by β = 1− vL+svH .
Hence, for β≤ β, one might expect that similar types of equilibria emerge as in the baseline
model. However, for β> β, firm H finds it no longer sufficient to price at vL+ s in order to
optimally discourage its local flexible consumers from searching. In contrast to the baseline
model, where firm L could not credibly convey that it may ever set a price below vL, this is
now clearly possible by simply setting an arbitrary price pL < vL. As it turns out, this varia-
tion introduces substantial additional complexity when the fraction of flexible H-consumers
β is large. In what follows, I will separately consider the cases β≤ β and β> β.
Proposition 8. Suppose that the flexible H-consumers observe pL, and that β ≤ β. Then
there exist three types of pricing equilibria.
(Pure) If α is small, α ≤ α′(β) := vLβ(vH−vL)+vL−βs , where α′(β) ∈ (α(β),1), there is a
pure-strategy equilibrium in which p∗H = vH , p∗L = vL, and all flexible H-consumers purchase
in L. L-market consumers are always served in this equilibrium. Firm H makes a profit of
Π∗∗H , while firm L makes a profit of Π∗∗L .
(Mixed I) If α is intermediate, α ∈ (α′(β),α′(β)], where α′(β) := vLvL(1−β)+β[vH(1−β)−s] ∈
(α′(β),1), the following constitutes an equilibrium:
• H samples prices continuously from the interval [pH ,vH), where pH =
vL(1−α+αβ)
αβ +
s > vL+ s, following the CDF FH(pH) = 1− 1−α+αβαβ
(
vL
pH−s
)
. Moreover, H prices at
vH with probability qH =
1−α+αβ
αβ
(
vL
vH−s
)
∈ (0,1).
• L prices at vL with probability qL = 1β − 1−ββ
(
vH
vL
(
1−α+αβ
αβ
)
+s
)
∈ [0,1). Moreover,
L samples prices continuously from the interval [pH − s,vH − s) following the CDF
FL(pL) = 1β − 1−ββ
(
vH
pL+s
)
.
• L-market consumers are only sometimes served in this equilibrium.
• H’s equilibrium profit is given by Π∗∗H , whereas L’s equilibrium profit is given by Π∗∗L .
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(Mixed II) If α is large, α> α′(β), the following constitutes an equilibrium:
• H samples prices continuously from the interval [pH ,vH), where pH = vH(1−β) >
vL + s, following the CDF FH(pH) = 1− vH(1−β)−spH−s . Moreover, H prices at vH with
probability qH =
vH(1−β)−s
vH−s ∈ (0,1).
• L samples prices continuously from [pH − s,vH − s) following the CDF FL(pL) =
1
β − 1−ββ
(
vH
pL+s
)
.
• L-market consumers are never served in this equilibrium.
• H’s equilibrium profit is given by Π∗∗H , whereas L’s equilibrium profit is given by
ΠL = [vH(1−β)− s]αβ.
Clearly, the pure-strategy equilibrium in which p∗L = vL and pH = v∗H is identical to the
one in the baseline model with imperfectly informed consumers. Again, firm H has no
incentive to retain its local flexible consumers by pricing at vL + s, as their fraction is too
small. In the baseline model, firm L’s best deviation was to price at vH in order to maximally
exploit the incoming searchers from H, who could not observe this deviation. In the new
framework, firm L’s best deviation is to increase its price only to vH − s (−ε), which is the
highest price for which it can still attract the flexible consumers from H, given pH = vH .
Of course, this implies that the parameter region for which (vL,vH) can be supported in
equilibrium increases (α′ > α).
But again, there is some critical value of α, α= α′, above which firm L has a profitable
deviation. This is to charge the highest possible price vH − s (−ε) that still attracts the
flexible consumers from H, even though this drives out its local consumers. As clearly,
firm H would want to counteract this by marginally undercutting in turn, there is a cycle
of best responses which rules out a pure-strategy equilibrium. Once again, two types of
mixed-strategy equilibria emerge.
The first, for intermediate α, has a similar structure to the mixed-strategy equilibrium of
the baseline model with intermediate α. In this equilibrium, both firms choose their local
monopoly price with positive probability, but they also draw prices from two convex regions
above vL. The bounds of these regions are now such that the effective prices paid by flexible
H-consumers, pH when buying at H and pL + s when buying at L, overlap. Hence, if H
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does not choose its mass point at vH , it samples prices from an interval [pH ,vH), while if
L does not choose its mass point at vL, it samples prices from the corresponding interval
[pH− s,vH− s) (with pH− s > vL).
If instead α is very large, firm L no longer finds it worthwhile to cater to its local con-
sumers. While H’s equilibrium strategy is still to price at vH with positive probability and
otherwise to draw prices from some interval [pH ,vH), firm L now only draws prices from
[pH − s,vH − s) (with pH − s > vL), which deterministically excludes its local consumers.
This differs qualitatively from the baseline model, where even as α→ 1, the L-market con-
sumers keep being served with strictly positive probability. Hence, with observable prices,
poor consumer groups may find it even harder to access certain product markets. Another
qualitative difference is that the “quasi-bimodal” equilibrium price distribution of Propo-
sition 4 (where, with positive probability, firm H offers a deep discount by pricing at the
flexible H-consumers’ reservation price) does not emerge in the perfect-information setting.
Information-acquisition costs are therefore a necessary prerequisite to induce bimodal price
distributions in the context of the present model.
Overall, the qualitative results of the baseline model are thus robust to the change in
information structure if there is a small fraction of flexible consumers and the relative size
of market H is low (pure-strategy equilibrium) or intermediate (first type of mixed-strategy
equilibrium), but not if its large. I now turn to the case where there is a large fraction of
flexible consumers, β> β.
Proposition 9. Suppose that the flexible H-consumers observe pL, and that β > β. Then,
the pure-strategy equilibrium of Proposition 1 does not exist anymore. Instead, there exist
three types of mixed pricing equilibria.
(Mixed III) If α is small, α ≤ α˜(β) := vL−[vH(1−β)−s]vL−(1−β)[vH(1−β)−s] (which is always the case for
β sufficiently close to 1, β≥ βˆ := 1− svH ∈ (β,1)), where α˜(β)> 0, the following constitutes
an equilibrium:
• L samples prices continuously from the interval [pL,vL), where pL =
vL(1−α)
1−α+αβ , fol-
lowing the CDF FL(pL) =
1− pL+spL+s
β . Moreover, L prices at vL with probability qL =
1− 1−
pL+s
vL+s
β ∈ (0,1).
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• H samples prices continuously from the interval [pL + s,vL + s), following the CDF
FH(pH) = 1− 1−ααβ
(
vL
pH−s −1
)
.
• L-market consumers are always served in this equilibrium.
• H’s equilibrium profit is given by ΠH =
(
vL(1−α)
1−α+αβ + s
)
α, whereas L’s equilibrium
profit is given by ΠL = vL(1−α).
(Mixed IV) If β is not too large, β < βˆ, and α is intermediate, α ∈ (α˜(β), αˆ(β)], where
αˆ(β) :=
vL−[vH(1−β)−s]
(
1− vLvH−s
)
vL−(1−β)[vH(1−β)−s]
(
1− vLvH−s
) > α˜(β), the following constitutes an equilibrium:
• H samples prices continuously from the interval [pH ,vL+ s), where pH = vH(1−β),
following the CDF FH(pH) =
1−α+αβ
αβ
(
1− pH−spH−s
)
. Moreover, H prices at vH with
probability qH = 1− 1−α+αβαβ
(
1− pH−svL
)
∈ (0,1).
• L samples prices continuously from the interval [pH−s,vL) following the CDF FL(pL)=
1
β − 1−ββ
(
vH
pL+s
)
. Moreover, L prices at vL with probability qL =
1−β
β
(
vH
vL+s
−1
)
∈
(0,1).
• L-market consumers are always served in this equilibrium.
• H’s equilibrium profit is given by Π∗∗H , whereas L’s equilibrium profit is given by
[vH(1−β)− s](1−α+αβ).
(Mixed V) If β is not too large, β< βˆ, and α is large, α> αˆ(β), the following constitutes
an equilibrium:
• H samples prices continuously from the interval [pH ,vL+ s), where pH = vH(1−β),
following the CDF FH,1(pH) =
1−α+αβ
αβ
(
1− pH−spH−s
)
. Furthermore, H samples prices
continuously from the interval [pˆH ,vH), where pˆH =
[vH(1−β)−s](1−α+αβ)
vH (1−β)−s
vL
(1−α+αβ)−(1−α)
+ s >
vL+ s, following the CDF FH,2(pH) = 1− (1−α+αβ)
[
vH(1−β)−s
(pH−s)αβ
]
. Finally, H has a
mass point of size qH = (1−α+αβ)
[
vH(1−β)−s
(vH−s)αβ
]
∈ (0,1) on vH .
• L samples prices continuously from [pH − s,vL) following the CDF FL,1(pL) = 1β −
1−β
β
(
vH
pL+s
)
. L has a mass point of size qL =
1−β
β
(
vH
vL+s
)
− 1−ββ vHpˆH ∈ (0,1) on vL. Fi-
nally, L samples prices continuously from [pˆH−s,vH−s) following the CDF FL,2(pL)=
FL,1(pL).
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• L-market consumers are only sometimes served in this equilibrium.
• H’s equilibrium profit is given by Π∗∗H , whereas L’s equilibrium profit is given by
[vH(1−β)− s](1−α+αβ).
It is thus apparent that when the flexible H-consumers are endowed with information
about firm L’s pricing, this drastically changes the equilibrium outcome, given that there
are many flexible consumers in the market. Indeed, irrespective of the size distribution of
markets, the original pure-strategy equilibrium fails to exist, and in every emerging mixed-
strategy equilibrium, both firms compete actively for the mass αβ of flexible H-consumers.
However, the type of mixed-strategy equilibrium depends crucially on the size of α. If α is
not too high such that market L is relatively large compared to market H (α ≤ αˆ(β)), firm
L never prices above its local consumers’ valuation in equilibrium. This is because serving
its local captives is more profitable than extracting high rents from incoming flexible H-
consumers. Therefore, competition for these consumers takes place at prices below pL = vL
and below pH = vL + s. Interestingly, for a sufficiently low α (α ≤ α˜(β) < αˆ(β)), firm H
always competes aggressively for its local flexible consumers, and never finds it optimal
to price at vH in order to maximally exploit its captive consumers. If instead α is large
(α > αˆ(β)), L prices above vL with positive probability in equilibrium, as selling at a high
price to the large mass of flexible H-consumers becomes attractive. In turn, firm H also
spreads some probability mass in the corresponding price region (on top of pricing at vH
with positive probability).
Figure 6 showcases the different equilibrium regions of the perfect-information frame-
work in (α,β)-space.
I conclude this section with some words on total welfare and consumer surplus in the
perfect-information framework. Note first that with perfect information, the social first-best
can no longer be achieved, as wasteful search activities take place with positive probabil-
ity in every equilibrium region. Hence, regulators striving to maximize market efficiency
should be cautious when implementing policies that improve consumers’ access to price in-
formation from outside markets, as this may backfire when promoting excessive search.35
35Of course, with downward-sloping demand, there would typically be a trade-off between inducing waste-
ful search frictions and reducing deadweight loss (by increasing competition), such that no clear-cut recom-
mendation can be given.
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Figure 6: Equilibrium regions with observable pL for vH = 200, vL = 100, s = 10.
On the other hand, making price information available to consumers tends to intensify price
competition, such that consumers in both markets may benefit from it. In particular, with in-
elastic demand, L-market consumers strictly benefit from making their local market’s price
visible whenever β> β, as in this case they start to make a positive surplus with strictly pos-
itive probability, which was not possible in the baseline model with imperfect information.
Consequently, better price information may improve consumer surplus at the cost of total
social welfare.
6 Conclusion
I have analyzed a market configuration in which consumers’ price-search behavior is driven
by segregation and a local difference in willingness to pay. In the model, two spatially
separated firms simultaneously set prices, where initially, each firm’s price is only observed
by its local consumer base. However, a group of “flexible” high-valuation consumers may
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search the non-local market at strictly positive cost, hoping to find a lower price. Inner-city
shopping across neighborhoods, or cross-border shopping, are examples of this.
An important feature of this model is that active search may occur in equilibrium, which
is driven by an interplay of taste and search-cost heterogeneity. Paradoxically, active search
only emerges if the fraction of flexible consumers in the high-valuation market is sufficiently
low, as otherwise, the local incumbent prefers to price aggressively and thereby discourage
its flexible consumers from searching. If active search occurs, the size distribution of mar-
kets is crucial for determining the equilibrium outcome. If the proportion of high-valuation
consumers is sufficiently large, non-trivial mixed-strategy pricing results: the firm in the
low-valuation market sometimes charges high prices in order to exploit incoming searchers
(while at the same time excluding its local consumer base), whereas its rival in the high-
valuation market sometimes offers discounts which may beat these exploitative prices. If
the market imbalance is severe enough, the firm in the high-valuation market offers a deep
discount with positive probability, which altogether discourages its local flexible consumers
from searching.
Two sources of welfare loss may arise in the market: A wasteful search friction in-
curred by searching high-valuations consumers, and deadweight loss induced by dropout
low-valuation consumers. While the comparative statics of total social welfare and con-
sumer surplus with respect to the flexible consumers’ search costs and their fraction in the
population are complex, regulators may want to focus on boosting the latter, as both welfare
and consumer surplus are maximized once a certain threshold is surpassed. It can be shown
that this result also prevails for the case of downward-sloping individual demand.
Lastly, I consider a variation of the baseline model in which consumers are endowed
with perfect information, yet still face positive travel costs. If the fraction of flexible high-
valuation consumers is large, this induces new types of mixed-strategy equilibria, reduces
social welfare, but increases the surplus of low-valuation consumers. Increasing competition
through endowing consumers with price information may thus promote consumer surplus at
the cost of overall efficiency.
The model can be extended in several dimensions. For example, it would be desirable to
allow for a more general (i.e., continuous) search-cost distribution. Preliminary calculations
have revealed that the main qualitative features of the characterized equilibria remain intact:
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active search can still only occur if not too many high-valuation consumers are tempted to
search, and also the same tensions lead to a breakdown of pure-strategy equilibrium. Alter-
natively, the assumption of homogeneous consumer valuations within submarkets could be
relaxed (e.g., consumers’ valuations could be normally distributed with two different means
across submarkets). Whether such a setup would remain tractable and give rise to qualita-
tively similar results is an open question for future research. Finally, it would be worthwhile
to allow for multiple firms within submarkets, which may still be able to reap positive profits
due to local differentiation. With perfect price information and symmetric firms within sub-
markets, it is conjectured that similar results to a model with downward-sloping individual
demand would arise. Indeed, it is straightforward to construct corresponding pure-strategy
equilibria.
Overall, the presented framework is a first attempt to model consumers’ search across
markets that are segregated by location and local demand characteristics. Due to its rele-
vance for important phenomena such as cross-neighborhood or cross-border shopping, its
rich predictions, and the numerous possibilities for extensions, it is hoped that fruitful and
diverse applications will arise.
References
Inaki Aguirre and Maria Paz Espinosa. Product differentiation with consumer arbitrage. International
Journal of Industrial Organization, 22(2):219–239, February 2004.
Simon P. Anderson and Victor A. Ginsburgh. International Pricing with Costly Consumer Arbitrage.
Review of International Economics, 7(1):126–39, February 1999.
Simon P. Anderson and Regis Renault. Pricing, Product Diversity, and Search Costs: A Bertrand-
Chamberlin-Diamond Model. RAND Journal of Economics, 30(4):719–735, Winter 1999.
Carmen Astorne-Figari and Aleksandr Yankelevich. Asymmetric Sequential Search. Technical
report, Department of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis, August 2011. URL
http://carmenastorne.com/Asymmetric%20Sequential%20Search%20Aug2011.pdf.
Carmen Astorne-Figari and Aleksandr Yankelevich. Consumer search with asymmetric price sam-
pling. Economics Letters, 122(2):331–333, 2014.
Kyle Bagwell and Garey Ramey. The Diamond Paradox: A Dynamic Resolution. Discussion Papers
1013, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management
Science, November 1992. URL http://ideas.repec.org/p/nwu/cmsems/1013.html.
Michael R. Baye, John Morgan, and Patrick Scholten. Information, Search, and Price Dispersion.
In Handbook in Economics and Information Systems (ed. T. Hendershott), volume 1, chapter 6.
Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2006.
31
Roland Benabou. Search Market Equilibrium, Bilateral Heterogeneity, and Repeat Purchases. Jour-
nal of Economic Theory, 60(1):140–158, June 1993.
Kendra Bischoff and Sean F. Reardon. Residential Segregation by Income, 1970-2009. Techni-
cal report, Russell Sage Foundation, 2013. URL http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/Data/
Report/report10162013.pdf.
Ken Burdett and Eric Smith. Price distributions and competition. Economics Letters, 106(3):180–
183, March 2010.
Kenneth Burdett and Kenneth L. Judd. Equilibrium Price Dispersion. Econometrica, 51(4):955–69,
July 1983.
Yongmin Chen and Tianle Zhang. Equilibrium price dispersion with heterogeneous searchers. Inter-
national Journal of Industrial Organization, 29(6):645–654, 2011.
Peter A. Diamond. A model of price adjustment. Journal of Economic Theory, 3(2):156–168, June
1971.
Richard Florida and Charlotta Mellander. Segregated City: The Geography of Economic Seg-
regation in America’s Metros. Technical report, Martin Prosperity Institute, Rotman School
of Management, University of Toronto, 2015. URL http://martinprosperity.org/media/
Segregated%20City.pdf.
Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. Journal
of Economic Theory, 53(2):236–260, April 1991.
Daniel Garcia, Jun Honda, and Maarten Janssen. The double diamond paradox. Technical report,
University of Vienna, Department of Economics, 2015.
Daniel Hosken and David Reiffen. Patterns of Retail Price Variation. RAND Journal of Economics,
35(1):128–146, Spring 2004.
Maarten C.W. Janssen, Jose Luis Moraga-Gonzalez, and Matthijs R. Wildenbeest. Truly Costly
Sequential Search and Oligopolistic Pricing. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 23
(5-6):451–466, June 2005.
Cenk Kocas and Tunga Kiyak. Theory and evidence on pricing by asymmetric oligopolies. Interna-
tional Journal of Industrial Organization, 24(1):83–105, January 2006.
Sergey Kuniavsky. Consumer search with chain stores. Discussion papers in economics, University
of Munich, Department of Economics, 2014. URL http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:
lmu:muenec:20799.
Andrés Leal, Julio López-Laborda, and Fernando Rodrigo. Cross-Border Shopping: A Survey. In-
ternational Advances in Economic Research, 16(2):135–148, May 2010.
James R. Marchand, Mary L. Rigdon, and John Roufagalas. Third Degree Price Discrimination: A
Profitable Arbitrage Case, a Note. The American Economist, 44(2):92–94, October 2000.
Chakravarthi Narasimhan. Competitive Promotional Strategies. The Journal of Business, 61(4):
427–49, October 1988.
32
Martin Obradovits. Going to the Discounter: Consumer Search with Local Market Heterogeneities.
MPRA Paper 66613, University Library of Munich, Germany, September 2015. URL https:
//ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/66613.html.
Martin Pesendorfer. Retail Sales: A Study of Pricing Behavior in Supermarkets. The Journal of
Business, 75(1):33–66, January 2002.
Surendra Rajiv, Shantanu Dutta, and Sanjay K. Dhar. Asymmetric Store Positioning and Promotional
Advertising Strategies: Theory and Evidence. Marketing Science, 21(1):74–96, October 2002.
Jennifer F. Reinganum. A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion. Journal of Political
Economy, 87(4):851–58, August 1979.
Andrew Rhodes. Multiproduct retailing. The Review of Economic Studies, 82(1):360–90, 2015.
Robert W. Rosenthal. A Model in Which an Increase in the Number of Sellers Leads to a Higher
Price. Econometrica, 48(6):1575–79, September 1980.
Steven Salop and Joseph E Stiglitz. Bargains and Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive
Price Dispersion. Review of Economic Studies, 44(3):493–510, October 1977.
Yuval Shilony. Mixed pricing in oligopoly. Journal of Economic Theory, 14(2):373–388, April 1977.
Babak Somekh. The Effect Of Income Inequality On Price Dispersion. Technical report, University
of Oxford and University of Haifa, 2012.
Babak Somekh. Shopping In A Segregated City. Technical report, University of Haifa, Department
of Economics, 2015.
Dale O. Stahl. Oligopolistic Pricing with Sequential Consumer Search. American Economic Review,
79(4):700–712, September 1989.
Dale O. Stahl. Oligopolistic Pricing with Heterogeneous Consumer Search. International Journal of
Industrial Organization, 14(2):243–268, 1996.
Hal R. Varian. A Model of Sales. American Economic Review, 70(4):651–59, September 1980.
Asher Wolinsky. True Monopolistic Competition as a Result of Imperfect Information. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 101(3):493–511, August 1986.
Donald J. Wright. Price discrimination with transportation costs and arbitrage. Economics Letters,
41(4):441–445, 1993.
Appendix A: Technical Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. (Existence) The proposed equilibrium implies the stated firm profits
of Π∗H and Π∗L. Given that H prices at vL+ s and the flexible H-consumers do not search, L
cannot do better than to price at vL (as pricing higher than vL would induce all L-consumers
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to exit the market, and pricing lower than vL induces no search, as it is unobserved by the
flexible H-consumers). Firm H’s best deviation is to increase its price to vH , lose all αβ
flexible H-consumers, but fully exploit its captive consumers. This gives rise to a maximal
deviation profit of Πdev∗H = vHα(1−β), which does not exceed Π∗H if β≥ β.
Proof of Proposition 2. (Existence) The proposed equilibrium implies the stated firm profits
of Π∗∗H and Π∗∗L . Each firm has a unique optimal deviation to this. First, H can reduce its
price to vL+ s, discourage the αβ flexible H-consumers from leaving, and make an optimal
deviation profit of Πdev∗∗H = (vL + s)α. By the reverse logic of Proposition 1, this is not
profitable if β ≤ β. Second, L can increase its price to vH , lose all L-consumers who drop
out of the market, but maximally charge the αβ searching H-consumers. This gives rise to
an optimal deviation profit of Πdev∗∗L = vHαβ, which does not exceed Π
∗∗
H if α≤ α(β).
Proof of Proposition 3. (Existence) In order for the proposed strategy-combination to form
an equilibrium, it is necessary that each price that is sampled by a given firm with positive
probability (probability density) must yield the same, maximal expected profit. Furthermore,
all equilibrium objects need to be well-behaved (e.g., mass points must fall in the range
[0,1]). In what follows, I will prove that this is satisfied for the characterized strategies.36
Note first that p> vL. Suppose now that the flexible H-consumers always search initially
(the respective condition will be verified further below), and start with firm L. We thus have
that ΠL(vL) =Π∗∗L , while for pL ∈ [p,vH ],
ΠL(pL) = pLαβ(1−FH(pL)) =Π∗∗L .
Moreover, given H’s pricing strategy, it is clearly the case that ΠL(pL)<Π∗∗L for p < vL and
p ∈ (vL, p).
Consider firm H next. For pH ∈ [p,vH ], we have that
ΠH(pH) = pHα(1−βFL(pH)) =Π∗∗H .
H’s best deviation is to price at the flexible consumers’ reservation price ρ and thereby
prevent the flexible H-consumers from searching. (Assuming still that ρ< p, ρ thus solves
q∗L(ρ−vL) = s, i.e., ρ= sq∗L +vL.) This deviation is not profitable if ρα≤Π
∗∗
H , which implies
vL+
s
q∗L
− vH(1−β)≤ 0. (4)
36For a more detailed constructive proof, see Obradovits (2015).
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To see this, note first that q∗L is strictly decreasing in α. Hence, as Proposition 3 requires that
α≤ α(β) = vL
(1−β)
{
vL+
vHβ[vH (1−β)−vL]
vH (1−β)−vL−βs
} , q∗L is bounded below by
1
β
− vH(1−β)
vL
( 1
α −1+β
)∣∣∣∣∣
α=α(β)
.
Simplifying this expression in a straightforward manner, it follows that q∗L ≥ svH(1−β)−vL ,
which confirms that inequality (4) is indeed satisfied.
I proceed to check that all equilibrium objects are well-behaved. Clearly, q∗H > 0 and p>
vL, while q∗H < 1 and p < vH both follow from α> α(β). Also q∗L < 1 follows immediately
from α > α(β). In order to show that q∗L > 0, I use the above finding that q∗L ≥ svH(1−β)−vL ,
where svH(1−β)−vL > 0 follows from β< β. It is also easy to check that FH(p) = 0, FH(vH) =
1−q∗H , FL(p) = q∗L, FL(vH) = 1, and that both CDFs are strictly increasing in prices.
It still needs to be verified that the flexible H-consumers will always search initially, i.e.,
q∗L(p− vL) > s. As it was already shown that q∗L ≥ svH(1−β)−vL , the above inequality is cer-
tainly fulfilled if svH(1−β)−vL
(
p− vL
)
> s, which implies vL(1−α+αβ)αβ > vH(1−β). Because
the LHS of this inequality strictly decreases in α, it is straightforward to show that this is
indeed the case if α≤ α(β) and β< β.
Lastly, it remains to prove the claim that α(β) ∈ (α(β),1) whenever β< β. For α(β) =
vL
(1−β)
{
vL+
vHβ[vH (1−β)−vL]
vH (1−β)−vL−βs
} > vLβ(vH−vL)+vL = α(β), a straightforward manipulation shows that
this is indeed the case (for β < β). On the other hand, the inequality α(β) < 1 can be
reduced to [(1−β)vH− vL]2 + vLβs > 0 if β > 0, which is always satisfied. For β = 0, it
holds that α(β) = 1.
Proof of Proposition 4. (Existence) Again, in order for the proposed strategy-combination
to form an equilibrium, it is necessary that each price that is sampled by a given firm with
positive probability (probability density) must yield the same, maximal expected profit. Fur-
thermore, all equilibrium objects need to be well-behaved (e.g., mass points must fall in the
range [0,1]). As in the proof of Proposition 3, I will show that this is satisfied for the char-
acterized strategies.37
37A more detailed constructive proof can again be found in Obradovits (2015).
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Note first that ρ∗ ∈ (vL, p), as follows from β< β. Furthermore, ρ∗ indeed constitutes the
flexible H-consumers’ reservation price, as q∗L,vL(ρ
∗− vL) = s. Hence, given H’s specified
strategy, the flexible H-consumers visit market L with probability 1−q∗H,ρ.
If firm L prices at vL, its profit is given by
ΠL(vL) = vL(1−α+αβ(1−q∗H,ρ)) =Π∗∗∗L .
If instead L chooses some price pL ∈ [p,vH ], it also makes an expected profit of
ΠL(pL) = pLαβ(1−FH(pL)) =Π∗∗∗L .
Moreover, given H’s pricing strategy, clearly ΠL(pL)<Π∗∗∗L for pL < vL and pL ∈ (vL, p).
Consider firm H next. For p = ρ∗, we have that
ΠH(ρ∗) = ρ∗α=Π∗∗H .
If instead H chooses some price pH ∈ [p,vH ], it follows that
ΠH(pH) = pHα(1−βFL(pH)) =Π∗∗H .
Moreover, given L’s pricing strategy, clearly ΠH(pH)<Π∗∗H for pH < ρ∗ and pH ∈ (ρ∗, p).
I finally check that all equilibrium objects are well-behaved. Observe first that q∗L,vL ∈
(0,1) follows directly from β< β. Note next that q∗H,ρ > 0 is equivalent to p >
vL(1−α+αβ)
αβ .
As p = vH(1−β)[vH(1−β)−vL]vH(1−β)−vL−βs does not depend on α while
vL(1−α+αβ)
αβ strictly decreases in α,
the inequality is hardest to fulfill for the boundary level α(β). Indeed, after a straightfor-
ward calculation, it turns out that the RHS equals the LHS for α = α(β). Hence, for every
α > α(β) (as required by the proposition), it is in fact the case that q∗H,ρ > 0. It is further
immediate that q∗H,vH > 0. Note also that q
∗
H,ρ+q
∗
H,vH = 1− 1−ααβ
(
vLβ[vH(1−β)−vL−s]
[vH(1−β)−vL]2+vLβs
)
, which
is clearly less than one for β < β. Lastly, it is straightforward to verify that FH(p) = q∗H,ρ,
FH(vH) = 1− q∗H,vH , FL(p) = q∗L,vL , FL(vH) = 1, and that both CDFs are strictly increasing
in prices.
Proof of Proposition 8. Pure strategy: The proposed equilibrium implies the stated firm prof-
its of Π∗∗H and Π∗∗L . Each firm has a unique optimal deviation to this. First, H can reduce its
price to vL+ s, discourage the αβ flexible H-consumers from leaving, and make an optimal
deviation profit of ΠdevH = (vL + s)α. This is not profitable due to β ≤ β. Second, L can
increase its price to vH− s, lose all L-consumers who drop out of the market, but maximally
charge the αβ flexible-H-consumers (for pL > vH − s, they would not purchase from L).
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This gives rise to an optimal deviation profit of ΠdevL = (vH − s)αβ, which does not exceed
Π∗∗H if α≤ α′(β).
Mixed I: Note first that pH > vL + s, which implies that ΠL(vL) = Π
∗∗
L . On the other hand,
for pL ∈ [pH− s,vH− s),
ΠL(pL) = pLαβ(1−FH(pL+ s)) =Π∗∗L .
Clearly, ΠL(pL)<Π∗∗L for pL < vL, pL ∈ (vL, pH− s), and pL > vH− s.
Next, for pH ∈ [pH ,vH ], we have that
ΠH(pH) = pHα[1−βFL(pH− s)] =Π∗∗H ,
and clearly ΠH(pH)<Π∗∗H for pH < pH .
It remains to check that all equilibrium objects are well-behaved. Observe first that
qL≥ 0 follows from α≤α′(β), whereas qL < 1 follows from α>α′(β). Moreover, qH > 0 is
immediate, while qH < 1 follows from α>α′(β). Also pH < vH is implied by α>α
′(β). Fi-
nally, it is easy to check that FL(pH−s)= qL, FL(vH−s)= 1, FH(pH)= 0, FH(vH)= 1−qH ,
and that both CDFs are strictly increasing in prices.
Mixed II: Note first that pH ≥ vL+ s due to β ≤ β, which implies that ΠL = ΠL(pH − s) =
(pH− s)αβ. Also for pL ∈ (pH− s,vH− s), it holds that
ΠL(pL) = pL [αβ(1−FH(pL+ s))] =ΠL.
Clearly, ΠL(pL) < ΠL for pL ∈ (vL, pH − s) and pL > vH − s. On the other hand, L’s best
possible deviation is to price at vL < pH − s and also serve its local consumers, which gives
a maximal deviation profit of ΠdevL = vL(1− α+ αβ). It is however easy to check that
ΠdevL <ΠL due to α> α
′(β).
Next, for pH ∈ [pH ,vH ], we have that
ΠH(pH) = pHα[1−βFL(pH− s)] =Π∗∗H ,
and clearly ΠH(pH)<Π∗∗H for pH < pH .
It remains to check that all equilibrium objects are well-behaved. Observe first that qH >
0 follows from β ≤ β, whereas qH < 1 is immediate. Also pH < vH is immediate. Finally,
it is easy to check that FL(pH − s) = 0, FL(vH − s) = 1, FH(pH) = 0, FH(vH) = 1−qH , and
37
that both CDFs are strictly increasing in prices.
Proof of Proposition 9. Mixed III: First, for pL ∈ [pL,vL], we have that
ΠL(pL) = pL[1−α+αβ(1−FH(pL+ s))] = vL(1−α) =ΠL.
Clearly, ΠL(pL)<ΠL for pL < pL and pL > vL.
Next, for pH ∈ [pL+ s,vL+ s), it holds that
ΠH(pH) = pHα[1−βFL(pH− s)] = α(pL+ s) =ΠH ,
and clearly ΠH(pH) < ΠH for pH < pL + s. H’s best possible deviation above vL + s is
to price at vH for a maximal deviation profit of Πdev = vHα(1− β). However, this is not
profitable due to α≤ α˜(β) (and it is easy to check that β≥ βˆ is sufficient for this).
It remains to check that all equilibrium objects are well-behaved. Observe first that
qL > 0 can be simplified to vL + s > vLα1−α+αβ . Since the RHS of this inequality is strictly
increasing in α, it is hardest to satisfy for α = α˜(β). Inserting α˜(β) and simplifying yields
the requirement vL + s >
vL−[vH(1−β)−s]
β , which is indeed true due to s < vH − vL. On the
other hand, qL < 1 can be reduced to pL < vL, which is evidently the case. Finally, it is easy
to check that FL(pL) = 0, FL(vL) = 1− qL, FH(pL + s) = 0, FH(vL + s) = 1, and that both
CDFs are strictly increasing in prices.
Mixed IV: Note first that ΠH(vH) =Π∗∗H . Also for pH ∈ [pH ,vL+ s), it holds that
ΠH(pH) = pHα[1−βFL(pH− s)] =Π∗∗H .
Clearly, ΠH(pH)<Π∗∗H for pH < pH and pH ∈ [vL+ s,vH).
Next, for pL ∈ [pH− s,vL], it holds that
ΠL(pL) = pL[1−α+αβ(1−FH(pL+ s))] = (1−α+αβ)(pH− s) =ΠL,
and clearly ΠL(pL)<ΠL for pL < pH− s. L’s best possible deviation above vL is to price at
vH−s for a maximal deviation profit ofΠdev =(vH−s)αβqH =(vH−s)αβ
[
1− 1−α+αβαβ
(
1− pH−svL
)]
.
However, this is not profitable due to α≤ αˆ(β).
It remains to check that all equilibrium objects are well-behaved. Observe first that
qH > 0 follows from α > α˜(β), whereas qH < 1 follows from β > β. Moreover, qL > 0
follows from s < vH − vL, whereas qL < 1 follows from β > β. It is also easy to see that
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pH < vL + s due to β > β. Finally, one can check that FL(pH − s) = 0, FL(vL) = 1− qL,
FH(pH) = 0, FH(vL+ s) = 1−qH , and that both CDFs are strictly increasing in prices.
Mixed V: Note first that ΠH(vH) =Π∗∗H . Also for pH ∈ [pH ,vL+ s), it holds that
ΠH(pH) = pHα[1−βFL,1(pH− s)] =Π∗∗H .
And again for pH ∈ [pˆH ,vH), we have that
ΠH(pH) = pHα[1−βFL,2(pH− s)] =Π∗∗H .
Clearly, ΠH(pH)<Π∗∗H for pH < pH and pH ∈ [vL+ s, pˆH).
Next, for pL ∈ [pH− s,vL], it holds that
ΠL(pL) = pL[1−α+αβ(1−FH,1(pL+ s))] = (1−α+αβ)(pH− s) =ΠL,
while also for pL ∈ [pˆH− s,vH− s),
ΠL(pL) = pLαβ(1−FH,2(pL+ s)) =ΠL.
Once more, we clearly have that ΠL(pL) < ΠL for pL < pH − s, pL ∈ (vL, pˆH − s), and
pL ≥ vH− s.
It remains to check that all equilibrium objects are well-behaved. Note first that pˆH >
vL + s follows from direct calculation, using the fact that the denominator of pˆH is strictly
positive. The latter is implied by α> α˜(β), which is true since by assumption α> αˆ(β), and
it is straightforward to verify that αˆ(β)> α˜(β). Likewise, pˆH < vH follows straightforwardly
from α> αˆ(β).
Next, qH > 0 follows directly from β < βˆ, as assumed. On the other hand, the require-
ment qH < 1 can be transformed to the condition α > αˇ(β) := vH(1−β)−s(1−β)[vH(1−β)−s]+(vH−s)β .
A straightforward calculation reveals that this is indeed implied by α > αˆ(β) and β > β
(namely, it holds that αˆ(β) > αˇ(β) for β > β). That qL > 0 is a direct implication of
pˆH > vL + s, as established above. Moreover, qL < 1 follows immediately from β > β and
pˆH < vH , where the latter has already been established.
Finally, it is easy to verify that FL,1(pH−s) = 0, qL = FL,2(pˆH−s)−FL,1(vL), FL,2(vH−
s) = 1, FH,1(pH) = 0, FH,2(vH) = 1−qH , and that all CDFs are strictly increasing in prices.
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Appendix B: Uniqueness of Baseline Equilibria
In what follows, I will show that the equilibria of Propositions 1 to 4 are unique, and that
this even holds when consumers in market L have the ability to search market H (at strictly
positive cost). To allow for the latter, assume that consumers’ search costs in market L
follow an arbitrary distribution G(s) = P(s˜≤ s), with lower bound sL > 0.
Lemma 1. No firm will ever price below vL in any equilibrium.
Proof. Denote the lower support bound of firm i’s ∈ {L,H} pricing strategy by pi, such
that it is to be shown that pi ≥ vL. To see this, assume to the contrary that pi < vL. Then,
consumers who observe a price in the range [pi, pi+min{s,sL}) (where pi+min{s,sL}< vH
by pi < vL and vL + s < vH) will never find it optimal to search, as their respective search
cost would surely exceed any price saving. In turn, instead of pricing at or slightly above pi,
firm i could profitably deviate by transferring this probability mass to a point close below
pi+min{s,sL} (if pi+min{s,sL} ≤ vL) or to vL (if pi+min{s,sL}> vL), as doing so would
not decrease its demand.
Corollary 1. L-market consumers will never search in equilibrium.
Proof. Since pi ≥ vL due to Lemma 1, it can never be profitable to search for L-market
consumers, as their expected surplus when doing this would be negative due sL > 0.
I proceed to prove uniqueness by a sequence of claims. In order to make the argument
less tedious, I henceforth assume that flexible H-consumers who are indifferent between
searching and purchasing at H will always do the latter, as motivated in the model setup.
(A) Pure-strategy equilibria
Claim 1. In any pure-strategy equilibrium, p∗L = vL.
Proof. Due to Lemma 1, it remains to be shown that p∗L > vL cannot be part of any pure-
strategy equilibrium. Suppose to the contrary that it does (and hence, that L cannot sell
to its local consumers). Then it must hold that p∗L + s < vH . Otherwise, the flexible H-
consumers would not even search L after observing pH = vH , implying that L would not
attract any consumers (hence, L could profitably deviate by charging vL). Given a pure p∗L
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(with p∗L + s < vH), there is no need for H to randomize, such that one of the following
two options maximizes its profit. First, if β is sufficiently large, H finds it optimal to price
at p∗L + s and discourage its local flexible consumers from searching. But this cannot be
part of an equilibrium, as L would face zero demand (and could again profitably deviate to
vL). Second, if β is not that large, H finds it optimal to charge vH . This fully exploits its
local captive consumers, but due to p∗L+ s < vH , the flexible H-consumers would all search
and purchase at L. However, this cannot be part of an equilibrium either, as then L would
have a profitable deviation by increasing its price to vH − ε. As this is unobserved by the
flexible H-consumers, they would still search L and purchase there. Hence, a pure-strategy
equilibrium in which L charges a higher price than vL can be ruled out.
Claim 2. There are only two possible pure-strategy equilibria. First, if and only if β≥ β=
1− vL+svH , the pair p∗L = vL, p∗H = vL + s constitutes an equilibrium. Second, if and only if
β≤ β and α≤ α(β) = vLβ(vH−vL)+vL , the pair p∗L = vL, p∗H = vH constitutes an equilibrium.
Proof. From Claim 1 it is known that p∗L = vL in any pure-strategy equilibrium. Given this
price and the flexible H-consumers’ optimal search behavior, it is easy to check that H finds
it strictly optimal to charge vL + s if β > β, while it finds it strictly optimal to charge vH
if β < β (for β = β, H is indifferent). In the first case, since the flexible H-consumers are
discouraged from searching, L cannot have a profitable deviation, as it already maximally
exploits its local consumers. In the second case, since vH − vL > s by assumption, all αβ
flexible H-consumers find it optimal to search and buy at L. However, given this, L may
have a profitable deviation by increasing its price to vH−ε (for ε sufficiently small), driving
out its local consumers, but fully exploiting the incoming searchers. It is easy to check that
this is not the case if and only if α≤ α(β).
(B) Mixed-strategy equilibria
In what follows, denote the lower support bound of firm i’s pricing strategy, where i ∈
{L,H}, by pi and the upper support bound by pi, with pi > pi.
Claim 3. pL = vL.
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Proof. Suppose to the contrary that pL ∈ (vL,vH).38 Then the L-consumers will never buy in
equilibrium. Moreover, it has to hold that pH ≥min{pL+s,vH}, as H can already guarantee
to discourage its flexible consumers from searching for this price. Hence, pricing any lower
cannot be optimal (unless pL + s > vH , in which case vH should be chosen). But in turn,
L could profitably transfer all probability mass at and close above pL in the direction of
min{pL+s,vH}, which contradicts the assertion that pL can be L’s lower support bound.
Claim 4. L must have a mass point at vL.
Proof. Given pL = vL, it must again hold that pH ≥ vL+ s (see the proof of Claim 3 above).
In turn, L cannot find it optimal to price close above vL, as transferring this probability mass
to a price close below vL+ s would not decrease its demand. Hence, there is certainly a hole
in L’s equilibrium price distribution close above vL, such that L must have a mass point at
vL due to pL = vL (see Claim 3).
Claim 5. pH = vH .
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that pH ∈ (vL + s,vH).39 Then there are two possibilities.
First, suppose that the flexible H-consumers search if they observe pH . Then, since it must
hold that pL ≤ pH (otherwise, L would not make any sales for prices where pL > pH , imply-
ing zero profits), H could make a higher profit by pricing at vH instead of pH , as this would
not lose any additional consumers. Hence this cannot be part of an equilibrium. Second, sup-
pose that the flexible H-consumers do not search at pH . If they strictly prefer not to search,
H would have a profitable deviation by pricing slightly higher. If the flexible H-consumers
are indifferent between searching and not searching for pH = pH , it follows that H should
concentrate all probability mass at pH (as it makes no sense to charge any price lower than
pH if the latter already discourages the flexible H-consumers from searching). That is, in
the respective equilibrium, H would charge some deterministic price p∗H ∈ (vL+ s,vH), and
the flexible H-consumers would all stay at H (being indifferent between searching and not
searching). But then, L’s dominant action would be to charge vL with full probability mass
38Clearly, pL = vH cannot be part of an equilibrium, as this would never generate search from H, implying
zero profits by L.
39Since pL = vL, it follows that pH ≥ vL + s. For a mixed-strategy equilibrium, it also cannot hold that
pH = pH = vL + s (such that H plays a pure strategy), as this would induce L to play the pure strategy vL,
giving rise to a pure-strategy equilibrium. Hence pH > vL+ s must hold.
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in order to maximally exploit its local consumers. In turn, since the hypothesized p∗H is
larger than vL+ s, the flexible H-consumers should optimally search: a contradiction.
From now on, let p′L denote the lower support bound of L’s pricing strategy for prices that
strictly exceed vL. Furthermore, let ρ denote the flexible H consumers’ reservation price,
i.e. the price which makes them indifferent between visiting L and purchasing directly at H.
Claim 6. ρ< vH .
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that ρ≥ vH . Then the flexible H-consumers would not even
search for pH = vH , which implies p∗H = vH and p∗L = vL. But then, ρ = vL + s < vH , a
contradiction.
Claim 7. ρ ∈ (vL+ s, p′L].
Proof. First, ρ > vL + s follows directly from pL = vL (see Claim 3) and the fact that L
does not put full probability mass on vL (if it did, a pure-strategy equilibrium would result).
Hence, in order to make the flexible H-consumers indifferent between searching L and pur-
chasing at H, choosing a price slightly larger than vL + s is sufficient for H. Second, in
order to establish that ρ ≤ p′L, suppose to the contrary that ρ > p′L. But then, the positive
probability mass that L puts in the range [p′L,ρ) could profitably be transferred to ρ, as the
flexible H-consumers will not search anyway if H samples a price that is weakly lower than
ρ (hence, charging pL = ρ already beats all the prices H may set which induce search).
Claim 8. H must have a mass point at vH .
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that pH = vH (as established by Claim 5), but H has no mass
point at vH . Then there exists some d > 0 such that H puts a probability mass of less than
vL(1−α)
vH
< 1 in the interval [vH − d,vH ]. This in turn implies that L will not find it optimal
at all to sample prices pL ≥ vH − d, i.e., it must hold that pL ≤ vH − d. This is because by
pricing in that interval, L’s profit is bounded above by vH ∗Pr{p˜H ≥ vH−d}< vH ∗ vL(1−α)vH =
vL(1−α), where the latter profit could be guaranteed if L priced at vL. Because of this, H
also cannot find it optimal to put any probability mass in the interval (vH − d,vH).40 But
40As ρ≤ p′L≤ pL (where the first inequality follows from Claim 7), any price that H samples in (vH−d,vH)
would induce search by the flexible H-consumers, which leads them to leave H with certainty (due to pL ≤
vH −d). Therefore, H strictly prefers to sample vH in order to maximally exploit its captive consumers.
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if H has no mass point at vH , this leads to a contradiction, as it would then follow that
pH ≤ vH−d.
Claim 9. L cannot have a mass point at vH .
Proof. Note that H prices at vH with strictly positive probability due to Claim 8, and that
the flexible H-consumers always search at this price due to Claim 6. Then, if L also had
a mass point at vH , ties would arise with positive probability. In turn, no matter how the
flexible H-consumers’ indifference was resolved, at least one firm would have an incentive
to undercut vH marginally and break the indifference in its favor.
Claim 10. If H samples ρ in equilibrium, it must be the case that H has a mass point at ρ,
and that there is no probability mass below ρ or immediately above ρ.
Proof. First, it is clear that H will not put any probability mass below ρ, as already pricing
at ρ ensures that all H-consumers will stay in H. Moreover, since L has a mass point at vL
(see Claim 4), pricing marginally above ρ entails a discrete loss for H (since the flexible
H-consumers will search and find a price of vL with positive probability). Hence, H cannot
put any probability mass immediately above ρ. Then, the fact that H can only sample ρ
directly (and not any prices very close to ρ) implies that H must have a mass point at ρ if ρ
is sampled at all in equilibrium.
Claim 11. H cannot put any probability mass in (ρ, p′L).
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Proof. Suppose to the contrary that this was the case. Then any price pH in that interval
would lead to search by the flexible H-consumers. However, because L will only sell to
these searching consumers if it prices at vL (due to pH < p′L), H has a profitable deviation to
transfer all of its probability mass in (ρ, p′L) to a price arbitrarily close to p
′
L.
From now on, let p′H denote the lower support bound of H’s pricing strategy for prices
that strictly exceed ρ.
Claim 12. p′L = p
′
H =: p.
41Recall that ρ≤ p′L due to Claim 7.
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Proof. Claim 11 already established that p′H ≥ p′L. It remains to show that it cannot be the
case that p′H > p
′
L. To see this, suppose that the relation holds. But then, due to p
′
L ≥ ρ (see
Claim 7), the flexible H consumers will always search when H does not price at ρ (if it does
so at all), and thus L could profitably deviate by transferring all of its probability mass in the
interval [p′L, p
′
H) to a price arbitrarily close below p
′
H .
Claim 13. pL = pH = vH .
Proof. The second equality is given by Claim 5. To establish the first, suppose to the con-
trary that pL < pH = vH . Then clearly, because ρ ≤ pL (as follows from Claim 7), H will
not find it optimal to put any probability mass in (pL,vH), as this is strictly dominated by
pricing at vH (and at least fully exploiting its captive consumers). But in turn, it cannot be
optimal for L to sample pL, as this will only win H’s flexible consumers if H prices at vH .
Hence, by deviating to vH− ε, L could increase its profit.
Claim 14. Neither H nor L can have a mass point in [p,vH).
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that H (L) does have a mass point at some price pˆ ∈ [p,vH).
Then there must exist some d > 0 such that L (H) will never find it optimal to price in
(pˆ, pˆ+ d], as L’s (H’s) profit drops discontinuously at pˆ. But then, H (L) should not have
a mass point at pˆ in the first place, as pricing closer to pˆ+ d would give the firm a strictly
higher profit.
Claim 15. If one firm puts no probability mass in some interval [a,b] ⊂ [p,vH), the other
firm cannot do so either.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that only one firm puts positive probability mass in [a,b].
But then, it must have a mass point at b, as pricing anywhere in [a,b) gives the firm a strictly
lower expected profit than pricing at b. However, this contradicts Claim 14.
Claim 16. The firms cannot have any holes in their pricing range above p.
Proof. Suppose they do. Then, examine the lowest of such holes, and denote its infimum by
z > p. Clearly, as the firms can have no mass points in [p,vH) due to Claim 14, it cannot be
optimal for either firm to price at z and close below, as shifting this probability mass towards
the top of the lowest hole yields a strictly higher expected profit. In particular, this is always
possible due to Claim 15.
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To sum up, the above claims establish the following. First, only two pure-strategy equi-
libria exist. These are given by p∗L = vL and p∗H = vL+ s (for β≥ β) and p∗L = vL, p∗H = vH
(for β≤ β and α≤ α(β)). Second, any mixed-strategy equilibrium must satisfy the follow-
ing: (i) no firm ever prices below vL, (ii) L has a mass point on vL, (iii) H has a mass point
on vH , (iv) if H samples the flexible H-consumers’ reservation price ρ, it must have a mass
point on it (and it holds that vL < ρ ≤ p′L), (v) there can be no other mass points, (vi) both
L and H spread probability mass over a common interval [p,vH ], and (vii) this interval does
not contain any holes.
It is now straightforward to check that each of the four equilibria in Propositions 1 to 4
fulfills these criteria. Moreover, it can be verified that only the specified equilibria in their
respective parameter ranges do indeed constitute equilibria.
More specifically, Proposition 1 states that whenever β> β, the unique equilibrium of the
game is such that p∗L = vL, p∗H = vL+ s, and no consumers search. The candidate equilibria
of Propositions 2 to 4 must all fail, as in each of these, firm H’s expected profit is given by
vHα(1−β), which, for β > β, is strictly worse than what H could achieve by deviating to
vL+ s (and thereby, discouraging its local consumers from searching).
Proposition 2 states that whenever β < β and α ≤ α(β), the unique equilibrium of the
game is such that p∗L = vL and p∗H = vH . Clearly, the equilibrium of Proposition 1 must
fail, because for β< β, H finds discouraging its local consumers from searching by pricing
at vL + s to be dominated by pricing at vH . The equilibrium of Proposition 3 must fail,
for example because α ≤ α(β) implies q∗H ≥ 1 (with strict equality for α < α(β)). The
equilibrium of Proposition 4 must also fail, as α ≤ α(β) together with β < β implies that
q∗H,ρ < 0.
Proposition 3 claims that there is a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium with mass points
on vH (by H) and vL (by L) if β< β and α ∈ (α(β),α(β)]. Again, the pure-strategy equilib-
rium of Proposition 1 must fail because discouraging its local consumers from searching by
pricing at vL+s is not profitable for H when β> β. The pure-strategy equilibrium of Propo-
sition 2 must also fail, as α > α(β) implies that L could profitably deviate from p∗L = vL to
charging vH . The equilibrium of Proposition 4 must fail, as α≤ α(β) implies q∗H,ρ ≤ 0.
Proposition 4 says that there is a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium with mass points on
vH and ρ∗ = vH(1−β) (by H) and vL (by L) if β< β and α> α(β). Clearly, the equilibria
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of Propositions 1 and 2 must fail due to the same reasons as given above (in particular,
the equilibrium of Proposition 2 can be ruled out because α > α(β) implies α > α(β) for
β < β). Lastly, the equilibrium of Proposition 3 must fail because of the following. In this
candidate equilibrium, L charges vL with probability q∗L =
1
β− vHα(1−β)vL(1−α+αβ) , while both L and
H sample prices from an identical continuous interval [p,vH ], with p =
vL(1−α+αβ)
vHαβ > vL.
Suppose that q∗L is well-behaved, such that it falls in the range (0,1) (if this is not the case,
the considered equilibrium fails anyway). Now there are three situations to consider. In
parameter constellations where q∗L(p−vL)> s, the flexible H-consumers would even find it
optimal to search L if firm H charged its lowest equilibrium price p. A potentially profitable
deviation by H is then to charge a price ρ′< p that satisfies q∗L(ρ′−vL)= s (i.e., ρ′= sq∗L +vL),
which is sufficient to discourage the flexible H-consumers from searching. This gives H a
deviation profit of ρ′α =
(
s
q∗L
+ vL
)
α, compared to the candidate equilibrium’s profit of
vHα(1−β). Hence, the equilibrium of Proposition 3 fails to exist if sq∗L + vL > vH(1−β).
Since q∗L is strictly decreasing in α and q∗L =
s
vH(1−β)−vL for α = α(β), it is easy to check
that this is indeed the case if α > α(β). For parameter constellations where q∗L(p− vL) < s
(such that the flexible H-consumers would not want to search when facing a price of p
or slightly higher), the candidate equilibrium of Proposition 3 also breaks down. This is
because firm H could sample (slightly) higher prices than p without losing any demand,
implying a profitable deviation. Finally, if it holds exactly that q∗L(p− vL) = s, the flexible
H-consumers would not search if H charges exactly p, but they would do so for any higher
price in the firm’s pricing domain. It follows that H would have a profitable deviation by
transferring probability mass from close above p to p.
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